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Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus,
Citizenship, and Article III
STEPHEN I. VLADECK*
The jurisdiction of the federal courts to consider habeas petitions brought by
detainees held as part of the “war on terrorism” has been a popular topic to courts
and commentators alike. Little attention has been paid, however, to whether the
Constitution itself interposes any jurisdictional limits over such petitions. In a series
of recent cases, the U.S. government has invoked the Supreme Court’s obscure (and
obtuse) 1948 decision in Hirota v. MacArthur for the proposition that Article III
forecloses jurisdiction over any petition brought by a detainee in foreign or interna-
tional custody, including that of the “Multinational Force—Iraq.” This Article takes
on that argument, along with the citizenship-based distinction that the courts in the
current cases have thus far drawn to distinguish Hirota, and explains why Article III
imposes no such bar, even where the detainee is not a U.S. citizen. Instead, Article
III only bars such a petition if the detainee is not in the actual or constructive
custody of the United States. It concludes that the distinction that courts have drawn
in the current cases is not only untenable, but is indicative of Hirota’s deeper
flaw—namely, that it misconceived the relationship between Article III, citizenship,
and habeas corpus, and obfuscated the more important debate over the scope of the
substantive rights enforceable through the “Great Writ.”
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INTRODUCTION
In two recent cases, a pair of federal district court judges (and the D.C.
Circuit, on appeal) sustained subject-matter jurisdiction over habeas petitions
brought by U.S. citizens in the custody of Saudi Arabia and the Multinational
Force-Iraq (“MNF-I”), respectively.1 In both cases, the courts rejected the
government’s argument that federal jurisdiction was foreclosed by the Supreme
Court’s 1948 decision in Hirota v. MacArthur.2 Hirota, in the government’s
view, holds that the federal jurisdiction contemplated by Article III does not
1. Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19, 27 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d, No. 06-5126, 2007 WL 420137
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 9, 2007); Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004). In a third case, decided
after the first two, the district court concluded that there was no jurisdiction. Mohammed v. Harvey, 456
F. Supp. 2d 115, 117 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Mohammed ex rel. Munaf v. Geren, No. 06-5324
(D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2007); cf. In re Hussein, 468 F. Supp. 2d 126, 129–30 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that
there is no federal jurisdiction over a non-citizen seeking post-conviction relief in the custody of the
MNF-I); Ramadan v. Bush, No. 07-0297, 2007 WL 589795, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2007) (same).
2. 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per curiam).
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extend to petitions filed by anyone in foreign or international custody. Distin-
guishing Hirota, both cases concluded that the rule for which it stands does not
apply to U.S. citizens;3 so long as the petitioners sufficiently allege that they are
in the “constructive custody” of the United States, federal jurisdiction exists.
Very little has been written about Hirota. Even less has been written about the
implications of the absolute jurisdictional rule it purportedly erects. Given
media reports about the U.S. government’s program of “extraordinary rendi-
tion,”4 and the ever-increasing upsurge in U.S.-related overseas detention as
part of the war on terrorism,5 Hirota’s potential sweep is breathtaking, and the
time is ripe for a thorough recounting of the decision, its background, and its
implications.
Questions about Hirota abound. Just what did the decision hold? Why is it so
difficult to unpack? Why was it so quickly relegated to little more than a
historical footnote, only to resurface so quickly after September 11? Perhaps
most importantly, in broader strokes, can Article III possibly countenance either
(1) the absolute jurisdictional rule that the government has argued for in Abu Ali
and Omar; or (2) the citizenship-based distinction that both district courts used
to conclude to the contrary? If nothing else, these questions suggest that the
deconstruction of Hirota is long overdue.
* * *
Baron Ko¯ki Hirota, the “‘godfather’ of Japanese politics in the 1930s,”6 was
the one civilian sentenced to death by the Tokyo war crimes tribunal—officially,
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE).7 A one-time Prime
Minister of Japan and Foreign Minister during the earliest stages of World War
3. See, e.g., Omar, 2007 WL 420137, at *5 (noting that one of the two major distinctions between
Omar and Hirota is the citizenship of the petitioner); Omar, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 24–25; Abu Ali, 350 F.
Supp. 2d at 55. But see Omar, 2007 WL 420137, at *13 n.1 (Brown, J., dissenting in part) (rebutting
that citizenship was a deciding factor in Hirota).
As this Article went to press, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a habeas
petition brought by a U.S. citizen in the custody of the MNF-I. See Munaf, No. 06-5324, slip op. at 2.
The sole point of disagreement between the majority and Judge Randolph, who concurred in the
judgment, was whether Hirota’s jurisdictional rule applied to U.S. citizens. Compare id. at 3–4, with id.
at 1–2 (Randolph, J., concurring in the judgment).
4. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary
Rendition” Program, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106; see also David Weissbrodt & Amy
Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123 (2006).
5. One significant class of such detainees is those transferred from Guanta´namo. For a cogent and
comprehensive survey, see Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guanta´namo: The Law of International
Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657 (2006).
6. JOHN L. GINN, SUGAMO PRISON, TOKYO: AN ACCOUNT OF THE TRIAL AND SENTENCING OF JAPANESE WAR
CRIMINALS IN 1948 BY A U.S. PARTICIPANT 20 (1992); see generally SABURO SHIROYAMA, WAR CRIMINAL:
THE LIFE AND DEATH OF HIROTA KOKI (John Bester trans., 1977).
7. For surveys of the background of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE),
see ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES
TRIALS (1987); TIM MAGA, JUDGMENT AT TOKYO: THE JAPANESE WAR CRIMES TRIALS (2001); and RICHARD
H. MINEAR, VICTORS’ JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (1971). See also HOWARD BALL, PROSECUT-
ING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE 62–86 (1999); Zhang Wanhong,
From Nuremberg to Tokyo: Some Reflections on the Tokyo Trial (On the Sixtieth Anniversary of the
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II in Asia, Hirota was convicted on three of nine counts—for his role as one of
the leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execu-
tion of a common plan or “conspiracy . . . [to wage] . . . wars of aggression, and
wars in violation of international law”; for “waging a war of aggression against
. . . . China”; and for deliberately and recklessly disregarding his duty to take
adequate steps to prevent atrocities.8 Effectively, Hirota was convicted for his
complicity in the Rape of Nanking.9 One of twenty-eight “Class A”10 defen-
dants tried before the IMTFE,11 Hirota was one of the eleven who sought
post-conviction relief in the courts of the United States.12
The relief Hirota sought was, to be sure, atypical. Bypassing the lower federal
courts, Hirota filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directly in the U.S.
Supreme Court, invoking the Court’s “original”13 jurisdiction over such peti-
tions pursuant to section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,14 the descendant of
which provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme
Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their
respective jurisdictions.”15 Although irregular, the procedure was hardly uncom-
mon, especially after World War II. Instead, Hirota’s was one of hundreds of
similar applications for “original” habeas relief filed in the U.S. Supreme Court
by Axis prisoners convicted of war crimes by American or Allied military
tribunals. The Court denied every other original application without argument
or an opinion (and usually by a 4–4 vote with Justice Jackson recused). Hirota
would be the one original war crimes case where the Court heard argument and
Nuremberg Trials), 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1673 (2006). For the charges against each defendant and the
verdicts, see MINEAR, supra, at 203.
8. See MINEAR, supra note 7, at 198–99.
9. See BRACKMAN, supra note 7, at 407; GINN, supra note 6, at 19–20. As Ginn describes, “Hirota
was either derelict in his duty by not insisting before the cabinet that immediate action be taken to stop
the [Nanking] atrocities, or he failed in other actions available to him to get the same results.” GINN,
supra note 6, at 20.
10. The Tokyo defendants were divided into three groups: “A” defendants were those charged with
crimes against peace; “B” defendants were charged with “conventional” war crimes; and “C” defen-
dants were charged with crimes against humanity. See JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE
WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 456 (1999).
11. Notwithstanding his complicity for Nanking, Hirota’s indictment was hardly a given. The U.S.
prosecutor responsible for developing the charges against Hirota described it as a “borderline case,” at
best. BRACKMAN, supra note 7, at 80; see also DOWER, supra note 10, at 459 & 628 n.29 (noting that
Hirota was convicted by the IMTFE with a 6 to 5 vote).
12. Along with an application filed by General Kenji Doihara and one filed by Marquis Koichi Kido¯
on behalf of himself and four additional defendants, which the Supreme Court considered together with
Hirota’s, the Court also rejected an application for leave to file an original habeas petition by four other
convicted IMTFE defendants on the same day it decided Hirota. See Kimura v. MacArthur, 335 U.S.
898 (1948) (mem.).
13. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 n.1 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (“Such a petition is
commonly understood to be ‘original’ in the sense of being filed in the first instance in this Court, but
nonetheless for constitutional purposes an exercise of this Court’s appellate (rather than original)
jurisdiction.” (citing Dallin H. Oaks, The “Original” Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court,
1962 SUP. CT. REV. 153)).
14. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (1789).
15. 28 U.S.C. §2241(a) (2000).
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issued more than a summary disposition—although not much more, as it would
turn out.
That Hirota was unusual, even among the war crimes cases, was clear from
the outset. Four Justices publicly dissented from the purely procedural order
setting the case for argument,16 provoking a response (given his tie-breaking
vote to the contrary) from Justice Jackson, who would otherwise recuse himself
from the subsequent proceedings because of his role as lead American prosecu-
tor at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.17 On the merits, the per
curiam decision denying the applications ran only three short and largely
inscrutable paragraphs. The only other opinion—a lengthy concurrence by
Justice Douglas—was filed more than six months later.18 And Justice Rutledge,
who announced that he was reserving his decision for a later date, died almost
an entire year later without ever recording his vote, perhaps the only non-
recusal “abstention” ever recorded in the U.S. Reports.
But Hirota’s true importance, and its broader implications for our understand-
ing of the relationship between Article III, citizenship, and habeas corpus,
comes from what it held. The crux of the decision was the per curiam’s
conclusions that “the tribunal sentencing the[] petitioners is not a tribunal of the
United States,” and that, as such, “the courts of the United States have no power
or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences
imposed on these petitioners.”19 Although the opinion nowhere invoked the
Constitution generally or Article III specifically,20 it has since been understood,
as it was by Justice Douglas in his post hoc concurrence, to hold that the
Constitution itself provides the jurisdictional bar to consideration of such
petitions,21 and that jurisdiction was inappropriate not just in the Supreme
Court, but in any U.S. court. Hirota thus suggests, at first glance, that Article III
stands as a categorical and insurmountable obstacle to federal jurisdiction over
any habeas petition brought by any individual in foreign or international
custody.
In so closely studying Hirota, my aim is to excavate the underpinnings both
16. Hirota v. MacArthur, 335 U.S. 876 (1948) (mem.).
17. Id. at 876–81 (Jackson, J.). Jackson characterized himself as “one who has been so identified
with controversial phases of war crimes law that he cannot expect others to consider him as detached
and dispassionate on the subject as he thinks himself to be.” Id. at 881. Hirota was to be the only war
crimes case in which he participated. And even in that case, he ultimately recused on the merits when
his vote was no longer dispositive.
18. Justice Douglas’s opinion, which appears consecutively in the U.S. Reports, 338 U.S. 197 (1949)
but not in the Supreme Court Reporter, see Hirota v. MacArthur, 69 S. Ct. 1238 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
concurring), was filed on the last day of the 1948 Term—June 27, 1949,—six months and seven days
after the per curiam was announced on December 20, 1948.
19. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 198.
20. In the order setting the case for argument, the four “dissenters,” Chief Justice Vinson and
Justices Reed, Frankfurter, and Burton noted that they were “of the opinion that there is want of
jurisdiction.” Hirota, 335 U.S. at 876 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 2).
21. See, e.g., Respondents’ Opposition to Petitioners’ Ex Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order at 16–17, Omar v. Harvey, No. 05-2374 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2006).
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of Hirota and of Justice Douglas’s post hoc concurrence, which has since been
read, at least in the lower courts, as creating a citizenship-based doctrinal rule.
The central question this Article attempts to answer is how Article III could
possibly countenance the distinction that the case law purportedly draws—
between the availability of habeas corpus to citizens held in foreign or interna-
tional custody, and the unavailability of habeas corpus to similarly situated
non-citizens.
As I explain, quite to the contrary of how courts and scholars have read
Justice Douglas’s Hirota concurrence, its rationale portends a jurisdictional
result fundamentally at odds with the Hirota majority. If Justice Douglas was
correct that the Hirota majority’s rule cannot apply to citizens, then it cannot
apply to non-citizens either, because of what might best be described as the
“structural rights” view of Article III. Instead, I argue that the federal question
jurisdiction contemplated by Article III can tolerate no distinction based upon
citizenship entirely because the “rights” it confers are structural, and therefore
exist irrespective of the status of those who invoke it. As Justice Souter put it:
“The writ is the writ. . . . There are not two writs of habeas corpus for some
cases and for other cases. . . . [T]he rights that may be asserted and the rights
that may be vindicated will vary with the circumstances, but jurisdiction over
habeas corpus is jurisdiction over habeas corpus.”22
Thus, although the scope of the substantive rights enforceable via habeas may
turn on the citizenship of the petitioner, the notion that Article III’s jurisdic-
tional limit in such cases is citizenship-based was wrong when Hirota was
decided, and remains dangerously wrong today. Properly understood, Hirota is
an absolute bar to all such habeas petitions, which is precisely why, for the
reasons Justice Douglas suggested in his concurrence, it cannot stand.
To be clear from the outset, my target is not the equally important but distinct
questions arising out of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,23 the Military
Commissions Act of 2006,24 and Congress’s power to strip jurisdiction over
habeas petitions by Guanta´namo detainees,25 which the Supreme Court largely
sidestepped in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,26 “and appears to have avoided reaching, at
least for the time being, by denying certiorari to review the D.C. Circuit’s
February 2007 decision in Boumediene v. Bush.27 Much has been written—and
22. Transcript of Oral Argument at 59, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-184.pdf.
23. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739–44 (2005).
24. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
25. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping in the War on Terrorism, 2 STAN. J. CIV. RTS.
& CIV. LIBERTIES 259 (2006); see also Caprice L. Roberts, Jurisdiction Stripping in Three Acts: A Three
String Serenade, 51 VILL. L. REV. 593 (2006); Maxim O. Mayer-Cesiano, Comment, On Jurisdiction-
Stripping: The Proper Scope of Inferior Federal Courts’ Independence from Congress, 8 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 559 (2006).
26. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
27. 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding constitutionality of Military Commissions Act), cert.
denied, No. 06-1195, 2007 WL 957363 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007), 75 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2007) (No.
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more certainly will be—about the implications of the Supreme Court’s 2004
decision in Rasul v. Bush,28 the statutory availability of habeas jurisdiction to
non-citizens held outside the United States, and the constitutional limits on
Congress’s power to foreclose judicial review of claims brought by such
detainees.29 But Hirota and its modern descendants bespeak a different kind of
jurisdictional question: Leaving aside the scope of Congress’s authority to
restrict the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts, does Article III itself
impose substantive limitations on the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to consider
habeas petitions by detainees in foreign or international custody?
As I argue, because there can be no citizenship-based distinction, the answer
to the underlying question must be no. Where any habeas petitioner alleges
sufficient facts to establish that he is in the “custody” of the United States, at
least within the meaning of evolving habeas jurisprudence, there is nothing in
Article III that should otherwise be read to limit the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Although the petitioners in Abu Ali and Omar were both U.S. citizens,
and the facts therefore (at least purportedly) allow Hirota to be distinguished
rather than overruled, their logic should extend with equal force to habeas
petitions brought by non-citizens. Whereas other constitutional provisions might
be—and have been30—read to countenance distinctions based upon citizenship
(or the absence thereof), whereas the rights enforceable via habeas may turn on
citizenship, and whereas Congress might constitutionally provide that statutory
jurisdiction turn on citizenship-based distinctions,31 it is difficult, if not impos-
06-1195); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006) (same); cf. Al-Marri ex rel.
Berman v. Wright, No. 06-7427 (4th Cir. argued Feb. 1, 2007) (raising whether the Military Commis-
sions Act constitutionally deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over a habeas petition brought by a
non-citizen detained within the United States).
28. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
29. For three excellent surveys of the contemporary jurisdictional issues from somewhat different
perspectives, see Richard H. Fallon Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2007); James E. Pfander, The
Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on Terror, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 497 (2006); and Tung
Yin, The Role of Article III Courts in the War on Terrorism, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1061 (2005).
See also Morad Fakhimi, Terrorism and Habeas Corpus: A Jurisdictional Escape, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
226 (2005). Pfander, the only of the above-cited authors to address Hirota, views its holding as
“refusing to exercise original jurisdiction,” Pfander, supra, at 517 n.132, without getting into the
messier issue of why the Court lacked power to proceed.
30. E.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a non-citizen in Mexico). At the heart of the
current debate over the rights of the Guanta´namo detainees is their entitlement to the protection of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–96
(2001); cf. Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 377–87 (2005) (extending Zadvydas to inadmissible
aliens).
31. Cf. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 486–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). For one prominent and
current example, the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Military Commissions Act, codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2241(e), applies only to non-citizens. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 7(a), 120 Stat.
2600, 2635–36 (2006) (“No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States
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sible, to read such a distinction into “the judicial Power of the United States.”32
To make this argument, I begin, in Part I, with Hirota itself. The brevity of
the per curiam opinion notwithstanding, the background of the case, the deeper
issues concerning the Supreme Court’s involvement in war crimes cases, the
strange opinion of Justice Jackson explaining his vote to set the case for
argument, the odd procedural posture of Justice Douglas’s concurrence, and the
still odder non-vote of Justice Rutledge, all testify to the uniqueness of the case
and the difficulty of the questions presented. Thus, Part I situates Hirota in the
broader context in which it was decided—in a post-war period during which
U.S. courts were on the verge of being flooded with habeas petitions filed by
German and Japanese war criminals.
To understand just what the majority in Hirota held, Part I summarizes the
pre-Hirota case law concerning the substantive scope of the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction to review non-Article III military tribunals, before concluding with
Justice Douglas’s cautious, if not reluctant, concurrence. Douglas wrote that he
would have sustained jurisdiction over the petitions, given the extent of the
authority that the U.S. government exercised over the Tokyo war crimes tribu-
nal and its defendants. But he concurred nevertheless because, in his words,
“the capture and control of those who were responsible for the Pearl Harbor
incident was a political question on which the President as Commander-in-
Chief, and as spokesman for the nation in foreign affairs, had the final say.”33
After exhaustively explaining why he thought the Constitution did not bar the
Court’s exercise of jurisdiction, in his last sentence, Douglas equivocated, and
concluded that the political question doctrine did.
In Part II, I turn to how Hirota has since been understood, both in the
academy and in the courts. Thanks to its decision two years later in Johnson v.
Eisentrager, in which it appeared to reject extraterritorial due process rights for
non-citizens in their entirety,34 the Court was never again confronted with a case
raising the question of whether the Constitution bars its jurisdiction over a
detainee in foreign or international custody.35 As Part II explains, although a
small handful of lower courts revisited the per curiam opinion and Justice
Douglas’s concurrence in the ensuing years, Hirota remained mostly ignored
until after September 11, when once more U.S. courts have been confronted
with habeas petitions brought by foreign and international detainees, and have
found, in Hirota, a messy and largely unsatisfactory precedent.
Part III compares the argument behind Hirota with the approach of the
who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant
or is awaiting such determination.”).
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
33. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 215 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring).
34. 339 U.S. 763, 781–85 (1950). But see Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475–79 (suggesting that the holding in
Eisentrager was far narrower).
35. The Court continued to issue orders denying such petitions after Hirota, but never again
published anything more than a cursory explanation of its reasoning.
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district courts and D.C. Circuit in three of the cases to consider this question
after 9/11: Abu Ali, Omar, and Mohammed. To that end, Part III summarizes
these three cases, briefly recounts the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with
respect to “custody” in habeas cases, and then situates the courts’ approaches in
Abu Ali, Omar, and Mohammed in light of that case law. As Part III argues, the
distinctions drawn by the district courts in Abu Ali and Omar (and affirmed by
the D.C. Circuit in Omar), while appealing, are ultimately unconvincing. Be-
cause of the structural rights theory of Article III, Hirota’s applicability cannot
possibly turn on citizenship, as Judge Lamberth recognized and as the D.C.
Circuit affirmed in Mohammed.36 And because the other grounds relied upon to
distinguish the 1948 decision are, as I argue, equally unavailing,37 Hirota rises
and falls as an absolute bar on jurisdiction. If Justice Douglas was right that
such a rule could not possibly apply to citizens, then the same logic compels the
conclusion that it does not apply to non-citizens either. Instead, as Part III
concludes, the real Article III issue in these cases, as implicitly suggested by
Justice Douglas in Hirota, is justiciability, not jurisdiction. Where petitioners
can satisfy Article III’s redressability requirement, which is perhaps the true
purpose served by Abu Ali’s and Omar’s custody analysis (and where the
decision in Mohammed is dangerously near-sighted), there is simply no constitu-
tional jurisdictional defect in habeas petitions brought by detainees in foreign or
international custody.
Finally, the Conclusion explains the importance of so thoroughly “deconstruct-
ing” Hirota. Given the Supreme Court’s recent Hamdan decision and the
ongoing debate over the continuing vitality of Eisentrager (and the concomitant
questions concerning the substantive scope of extraterritorial constitutional
rights for non-citizens),38 the importance of clearing away Hirota’s unnecessary
jurisdictional underbrush is undeniable.
I. HIROTA
Before turning to Hirota, it is important to set the stage by examining the
Supreme Court’s inconsistent and contested dispositions of habeas petitions
brought by convicted war criminals after World War II.39
36. Mohammed v. Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 124 (D.D.C. 2006); see also Omar v. Harvey, No.
06-5126, 2007 WL 420137, at *13 n.1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 9, 2007) (Brown, J., dissenting in part).
37. See infra notes 204–13 and accompanying text.
38. One recent example of a case involving a non-citizen attempting to enforce recognized extraterri-
torial constitutional rights is El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005), which highlights the extent to which the questions
addressed herein are not purely academic. See infra note 262.
39. For a helpful contemporaneous summary of the state of the Supreme Court’s habeas jurispru-
dence at the time Hirota was decided, see Note, The Freedom Writ—The Expanding Use of Federal
Habeas Corpus, 61 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1948). See generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 463–99 (1963) (summarizing
the evolution of federal habeas corpus from 1789 to 1952).
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A. QUIRIN AND YAMASHITA
With one famous and important exception, the Supreme Court did not
consider any habeas petitions during World War II filed by Japanese or German
soldiers, including those convicted of war crimes by military tribunals. The
absence of wartime business is easily explained: for the most part, the military
tribunals that would give rise to the flurry of post-war legal activity were only
convened once the fighting was over.40
The exception, of course, was the case of the Nazi saboteurs, Ex parte Quirin.41
Decided at Special Term in the summer of 1942, Quirin unanimously (but controver-
sially42) affirmed the constitutionality and lawfulness of a military commission cre-
ated by President Roosevelt to try eight German soldiers captured within the United
States. Although the result was not necessarily obvious based on extant case law, the
Court dealt quickly and summarily with any question as to its jurisdiction, noting that
“denial by the district court of leave to file the petitions in these causes was the
judicial determination of a case or controversy, reviewable on appeal to the Court of
Appeals and reviewable here by certiorari.”43
On the merits, the Court emphasized that “[w]e are not here concerned with
any question of the guilt or innocence of petitioners,”44 and inquired only into
the authority for the commissions and the extent to which they ran afoul of the
petitioners’ constitutional rights. Holding that the petitioners were not entitled to
a jury trial, that the commissions were lawful, and that Ex parte Milligan45 was
distinguishable,46 the Court concluded that
We have no occasion now to define with meticulous care the ultimate bound-
aries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to the
40. In addition, few habeas petitions were filed by enemy prisoners of war. A rare counterexample
was In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946), in which the Ninth Circuit denied, on the merits, a
habeas petition filed by a U.S. citizen captured while fighting for the Italian Army. The Court also
entertained only one habeas petition brought by a Japanese-American internee—Ex parte Endo, 323
U.S. 283 (1944). See infra note 128.
41. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
42. Justice Scalia has derided the decision as “not this Court’s finest hour.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774
(2006) (noting Quirin’s “controversial characterization of Article of War 15 as congressional authoriza-
tion for military commissions”). For recent discussions, see Jack Goldsmith, Justice Jackson’s Unpub-
lished Opinion in Ex parte Quirin, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 223 (2006) and Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten
Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863, 894–99
(2006). For more comprehensive summaries of the case and its troubling background, see LOUIS FISHER,
NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LAW (2003) and MICHAEL DOBBS,
SABOTEURS: THE NAZI RAID ON AMERICA (2004).
43. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24; see also Ex parte Quirin, 47 F. Supp. 431 (D.D.C. 1942) (denying the
petitions). In that regard, Quirin was one of the earliest examples of “certiorari before judgment,”
where the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is properly triggered once a case is properly filed in the courts
of appeals. See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998).
44. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
45. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
46. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38–45.
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law of war. It is enough that petitioners here, upon the conceded facts, were
plainly within those boundaries, and were held in good faith for trial by
military commission, charged with being enemies who, with the purpose of
destroying war materials and utilities, entered or after entry remained in our
territory without uniform—an offense against the law of war. We hold only
that those particular acts constitute an offense against the law of war which
the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military commission.47
A little more than three years later, Quirin was reaffirmed, although not
unanimously, in the first challenge to a post-war military tribunal—In re
Yamashita.48 General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the Japanese military governor of
the Philippines at the end of the war, was tried by an American military tribunal
for his alleged complicity in atrocities committed by Japanese troops in Manila
in the weeks after General MacArthur had trapped them in the city. Although
serious questions existed at the time (and remain today49) concerning Yamashi-
ta’s knowledge of—and liability for—the brutality of his troops, many of whom
had disregarded his orders by remaining in Manila, Yamashita was found guilty
of all 123 offenses with which he was charged, and was sentenced to death.50
Yamashita filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of
the Philippines, which was denied,51 before seeking review in the U.S. Supreme
Court.
As Judge Ferren summarizes, the Court was initially inclined to refuse to hear
the case, but eventually gave in to the strong views to the contrary expressed by
Justice Rutledge.52 On February 4, 1946, the Court issued its opinion, holding
that: (1) as in Quirin, Congress had authorized Yamashita’s trial by military
commission;53 (2) the fact that hostilities had terminated was not itself a bar to
the commission;54 (3) the allegations sufficiently established violations of the
laws of war to bring Yamashita’s trial within the military jurisdiction that Quirin
had recognized;55 (4) the procedures prescribed by General MacArthur were not
inconsistent with those set forth by the Articles of War or other Acts of
47. Id. at 45–46.
48. 327 U.S. 1 (1946). See generally RICHARD L. LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY (1982) (providing an exhaustive recounting of the background to Yamashita);
A. FRANK REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA (1949) (same).
49. See, e.g., Bruce D. Landrum, Note, The Yamashita War Crimes Trial: Command Responsibility
Then and Now, 149 MIL. L. REV. 293 (1995); cf. Craig Green, Wiley Rutledge, Executive Detention, and
Judicial Conscience at War, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 99, 150–74 (2006) (analyzing what remains of
Yamashita after Hamdan).
50. See JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY
RUTLEDGE 301–02, 308 (2004).
51. See LAEL, supra note 48, at 93–94.
52. John M. Ferren, General Yamashita and Justice Rutledge, 28 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 54, 60 (2003).
53. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7–11.
54. Id. at 11–13; see Stephen I. Vladeck, Ludecke’s Lengthening Shadow: Limits on the War Powers
When Wars Don’t End, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming Winter 2007).
55. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 13–18.
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Congress;56 and (5) the requirement in the 1929 Geneva Convention that notice
of the trial be provided to “the protecting power”—in Japan’s case, Switzerland—
did not apply because Yamashita’s offenses were not committed while he was a
prisoner of war.57
Justices Murphy and Rutledge each wrote separate, erudite, and angry dis-
sents from the majority opinion. For present purposes, however, their dissents
are not as significant as the Court’s own conception of its authority to review
the Manila military commission. As Chief Justice Stone noted:
We consider here only the lawful power of the commission to try the
petitioner for the offense charged. In the present cases it must be recognized
throughout that the military tribunals which Congress has sanctioned by the
Articles of War are not courts whose rulings and judgments are made subject
to review by this Court. They are tribunals whose determinations are review-
able by the military authorities either as provided in the military orders
constituting such tribunals or as provided by the Articles of War. Congress
conferred on the courts no power to review their determinations save only as
it has granted judicial power “to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose
of an inquiry into the cause of the restraint of liberty.” The courts may inquire
whether the detention complained of is within the authority of those detaining
the petitioner. If the military tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide
and condemn, their action is not subject to judicial review merely because
they have made a wrong decision on disputed facts. Correction of their errors
of decision is not for the courts . . . .58
The Court thus did have jurisdiction over a habeas petition brought by a
foreign national convicted by a U.S. military tribunal and held overseas, but
only to “inquire whether the detention complained of is within the authority of
those detaining the petitioner.”59 One week later, the Court, relying entirely on
Yamashita, summarily denied a similar application from General Masaharu
Homma (the Japanese officer responsible for the infamous “Bataan Death
March”), who had been convicted by another military commission in Manila.60
Justices Murphy and Rutledge again dissented on the merits,61 but none of the
Justices expressed any concern as to the Court’s jurisdiction.
56. Id. at 18–23.
57. Id. at 23–24.
58. Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
59. Id.
60. In re Homma, 327 U.S. 759 (1946) (mem.).
61. Id. at 759–61 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 761–63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). According to
Justice Rutledge, the reliance on Yamashita was misplaced given that “[o]ther serious questions,
affecting the validity and fairness of the commission’s constitution are presented which were not raised
in the Yamashita petitions.” Id. at 763.
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B. U.S. CITIZENS AND THE GERMAN POW CASES
Later in 1946, the Court was asked to review a series of original habeas
petitions brought by U.S. citizens detained in conjunction with offenses commit-
ted while overseas. As Charles Fairman summarizes,
Betz . . . was an American civilian whom a base section commander in Ger-
many had ordered to be held in confinement “prior to being turned over to
American Military Government to be tried for making an illegal entry into the
European Theater of Operations.” McKinley was an American civilian de-
tained on suspicion of having purchased platinum with counterfeit United
States currency. Pfc. Walczak was held on suspicion of being an accessory to
a murder. Captain Kathleen B. Nash Durant, WAC . . . asserted that she was a
commissioned officer and alleged fatal irregularities in the bringing of charges;
later she amended her petition to assert that she was a civilian not subject to
the Articles of War. . . . Wills was an officer in the merchant marine, Cutino
was a merchant seaman; each was held in the Kobe Base stockade in Japan,
without prompt trial, on suspicion of having committed a crime of which,
each asserted in a letter to the Chief Justice, he was innocent. Petitioner
Murphy, a priest in New York, prayed the Court to “intercede” for one of his
parishioners, an Air Corps private, held in Japan under sentence of death; it
appeared that this soldier had deserted his unit and joined another in the guise
of an officer.62
In refusing to hear the seven applications, the Court, for the first time in a
post-World War II habeas case, invoked the limits on its jurisdiction:
The motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied for
want of original jurisdiction. MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE are
of the opinion that as in Ex parte Hawk, where this Court declined to entertain
an application for relief by habeas corpus, the petition for habeas corpus
should be denied without prejudice to it being filed in the appropriate District
Court. MR. JUSTICE MURPHY is of the view that this petition raises questions as
to jurisdiction and proper procedure which should be heard and determined by
this Court. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision
of the application in No. 19, Miscellaneous.63
62. Charles Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REV.
587, 592 (1949).
63. Ex parte Betz, 329 U.S. 672 (1946) (mem.) (citations omitted). Hawk, an “original” habeas
petition filed by a state prisoner, held that the proper procedure for seeking federal habeas relief where
“resort to state court remedies has failed to afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions
raised” was to “proceed in the federal district court before resorting to [the Supreme] Court by petition
for habeas corpus.” 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944) (per curiam); cf. Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195, 2007
WL 957363, at *1 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007) (Stevens and Kennedy, JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari)
(citing Hawk as establishing “our practice of requiring the exhaustion of available remedies as a
precondition to accepting jurisdiction over applications for the writ of habeas corpus”).
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There matters stood until October 1947, when the Court summarily disposed
of the first original habeas petition brought by a convicted German war crimi-
nal, voting 4–4, with Justice Jackson recused, to deny review in Milch v. United
States.64 Justice Douglas joined the three dissenting Justices from Betz—Black,
Murphy, and Rutledge—in recording his vote that the case be set for argument
on the jurisdictional question, and the battle lines were drawn. As Henry Hart
and Herbert Wechsler noted in the first edition of The Federal Courts and the
Federal System, “[f]ourteen other war crimes cases were disposed of in Febru-
ary 1948 by an identical order . . . . However, three more cases in April 1948
met simply the response, ‘Petition denied’, without notation of dissent.”65
In Everett v. Truman,66 the last major original war crimes case to come before
the Court before Hirota, the Court again voted 4–4 to deny a petition filed on
behalf of seventy-four German soldiers convicted at Dachau for their role in the
Malmedy massacre. As the order denying review provided:
The CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. Justice REED, MR. Justice FRANKFURTER, and MR.
Justice BURTON are of the opinion that there is want of jurisdiction. U.S. Consti-
tution, Article III, Sec. 2, Clause 2; [also citing Betz, Milch, Brandt, and
Eichel].
MR. Justice BLACK, MR. Justice DOUGLAS, MR. Justice MURPHY, and MR.
Justice RUTLEDGE are of the opinion that the motion for leave to file the
petition should be granted and that the case should be set for argument
forthwith.
MR. Justice JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of the
motion.67
Of all the original applications the Court had thus far considered, Everett was
perhaps the case that most “cried for relief, even though the Supreme Court was
not the appropriate forum for granting it.”68 In a memorandum to the Confer-
ence urging that the case be set for argument, Justice Black maintained that the
petition “alleges a total lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal sentencing the
prisoners and charges that the convictions were the product of confessions
obtained by ‘mock trials’ and that the trials themselves were conducted in such
way as to deprive the prisoners and their counsel of any possible chance
64. 332 U.S. 789 (1947) (mem.); see also Fairman, supra note 62, at 593–94 (discussing the
background to Milch).
65. HENRY M. HART JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 284
(1953). For the denials to which they referred, see Brandt v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948) (mem.),
and In re Eichel, 333 U.S. 865 (1948) (mem.). Justice Douglas, who joined the dissenters in Milch, did
not record his dissent in Brandt. See also Fairman, supra note 62, at 594–97 (summarizing the facts of
the applications denied in Brandt and Eichel).
66. Everett ex rel. Bersin v. Truman, 334 U.S. 824, 824 (1948) (mem.).
67. Id.
68. Fairman, supra note 62, at 597; see also id. at 597–99. For a recent summary of the allegations
in Everett, see Maj. Warren L. Wells, Justice at Dachau, 181 MIL. L. REV. 164, 166 n.21 (2004) (book
review).
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adequately to set up their defenses.”69 But if Justice Black could not find four
votes for his argument in Everett, it was unlikely that another case, or at least
another case involving German soldiers, would come along where he could.
Repeating the language from Everett, the Court disposed of another fifteen
original petitions at the end of the 1947 Term,70 and thirteen more at the
beginning of the 1948 Term.71 And so, when Ko¯ki Hirota’s application for
original relief came to the Supreme Court in November 1948, the badly
fractured Court seemed poised to again deny the application in a 4–4 vote.
C. WHY “ORIGINAL” PETITIONS?
Before turning to Hirota, a brief aside is warranted given the odd procedural
history of the post-World War II war crimes cases. Looking backward with six
decades of hindsight, reliance on such an unusual and extraordinary procedural
vehicle—an original habeas petition filed directly in the Supreme Court—seems
odd, if not downright inexplicable. After all, the Supreme Court has not granted
an original habeas petition since 1925,72 and has only issued such extraordinary
relief three times since the Evarts Act of 189173 fundamentally altered the
structure of the federal court system74 (and provided the Supreme Court, for the
first time, with general appellate jurisdiction in federal criminal cases,75 render-
69. Memorandum for the Conference at 1 (May 17, 1948) (on file with the Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Container No. 292, Everett v. Truman Case File); see
also id. (“These grave charges in my judgment cannot be brushed aside.”). Although the Memorandum
was unsigned and copies appear in various of the Justices’ papers, the original, handwritten draft
appears in the files of Justice Black.
70. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 65, at 285 (citing Fairman, supra note 62, at 599–600); see
also In re Gronwald, 334 U.S. 857 (1948) (mem.); In re Ehlen, 334 U.S. 836 (1948) (mem.); In re
Krautwurst, 334 U.S. 826 (1948) (mem.).
71. See Fairman, supra note 62, at 600 & n.40a; see also In re Heim, 335 U.S. 856 (1948) (mem.);
In re Eckstein, 335 U.S. 851 (1948) (mem.); In re Vetter, 335 U.S. 841 (1948) (mem.); In re Stattman,
335 U.S. 805 (1948) (mem.).
72. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925). Notwithstanding the eight decades that have
elapsed since such relief was granted, the Court relied on the continuing availability of an original
habeas petition in Felker v. Turpin, to avoid a constitutional challenge to a statute divesting it of
appellate jurisdiction from the Courts of Appeals. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659–61 (1996).
But see id. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[I]f it should later turn out that statutory avenues other than
certiorari for reviewing a gatekeeping determination were closed, the question whether the statute
exceeded Congress’s Exceptions Clause power would be open.”). Just last Term, while denying
certiorari in the case of U.S. citizen “enemy combatant” Jose Padilla after his transfer to civilian
criminal custody, three Justices emphasized that, should the government return Padilla to military
custody, Padilla would be able to invoke the Court’s original habeas jurisdiction to expedite his claims.
See Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649, 1650 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari);
see also Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195, 2007 WL 957363, at *1 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007) (Stevens and
Kennedy, JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari) (noting the potential availability of original relief “[i]f
petitioners later seek to establish that the Government has unreasonably delayed proceedings under the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, or some other and ongoing injury” (citation omitted)).
73. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826–30 (1891).
74. See Oaks, supra note 13, at 193; see also Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919); In re Huff,
197 U.S. 488 (1905).
75. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, §5, 26 Stat. at 827–28.
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ing original habeas relief far less necessary76).
Why, then, were none of the habeas petitions in the war crimes cases filed in
the district courts, as the Betz order explicitly suggested they could be (at least
where U.S. citizens were involved)? The likely explanation is one of the last
decisions handed down by the Court during its 1947 Term: Ahrens v. Clark.77 In
Ahrens, over the dissents of Justices Rutledge, Black, and Murphy, the Court
held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that federal district courts were
generally without jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions from any detainee
not physically present within that district. As Justice Douglas wrote for the
Court,
the view that the jurisdiction of the District Court to issue the writ in cases
such as this is restricted to those petitioners who are confined or detained
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court is supported by the language of
the statute, by considerations of policy, and by the legislative history of the
enactment.78
In a footnote to the same passage, however, Ahrens expressly reserved “the
question of what process, if any, a person confined in an area not subject to the
jurisdiction of any district court may employ to assert federal rights,” citing for
that proposition Betz and its six companion cases.79 Ahrens at least formally left
unanswered whether district courts could exercise jurisdiction over habeas
petitions filed by overseas detainees. After Ahrens, however, the answer at least
appeared to be “no,” especially if some alternative form of relief remained
available.
Writing shortly after Hirota was handed down, and before Justice Douglas
76. See James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/
Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2072–73 (1992). As Liebman notes, “Congress gave
capital prisoners a right of appeal two years earlier.” Id. at 2072 n.453 (citing Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch.
113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655, 656).
77. 335 U.S. 188 (1948), modified by Braden v. Thirtieth Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484
(1973) (holding that a district court need only have personal jurisdiction over the respondent, not the
petitioner, to satisfy § 2241). For an intriguing modern account of the decision, see Joseph T. Thai, The
Law Clerk Who Wrote Rasul v. Bush: John Paul Stevens’s Influence from World War II to the War on
Terror, 92 VA. L. REV. 501, 504–15 (2006).
78. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 192 (footnote omitted). Ahrens’s district-of-confinement rule was met with
significant hostility, and would later be described as “a self-inflicted judicial wound.” United States ex
rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1128 (2d Cir. 1974).
Yet, to whatever extent Ahrens was vitiated by Braden, see, e.g., 410 U.S. at 502 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (“Today the Court overrules Ahrens . . . .”), but see Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 494 (2004)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Braden did not overrule Ahrens; it distinguished Ahrens.”), it was largely
resurrected by the Supreme Court, albeit via the so-called “immediate custodian” rule, in Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). Whereas Braden held that district courts need only have personal
jurisdiction over the respondent, Padilla held that the respondent must be the “immediate” custodian,
who is almost always in the same district as the petitioner. After Padilla, “core” habeas challenges in
which the detainee is physically present within some judicial district must usually be filed in that
district. See Armentero v. INS, 412 F.3d 1088, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2005) (Berzon, J., dissenting).
79. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 192 n.4.
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filed his concurrence, Fairman saw this as the prevailing view of Ahrens: “[I]f
the statute makes the presence of the petitioner a requisite to jurisdiction, how
can it make any difference whether the detention is in no district rather than a
different district?”80 If Ahrens turned on a particular construction of the “within
their respective jurisdictions” language in the federal habeas statute, how could
the location of the habeas petitioner affect (and perhaps provide an exception
to) the district court’s territorial jurisdiction?81 Ahrens may have reserved the
question, but its own analysis appeared to compel the answer. Moreover, this
reading was made explicit by the unreported—and heretofore overlooked—
decision of the D.C. district court in Eisentrager v. Forrestal (what would later
become Johnson v. Eisentrager).82 There, the court, citing only Ahrens, dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction statutory habeas petitions filed by twenty-two
German soldiers convicted of war crimes by a U.S. military tribunal and
imprisoned at Landsberg Prison in Germany.
With Ahrens suggesting that the federal district courts lacked jurisdiction
over petitioners not confined in any district, original relief in the Supreme Court
may well have seemed the only practicable alternative.83 In a series of cases
during the nineteenth century, the Court had established a number of proposi-
tions concerning its ability to entertain “original” habeas petitions pursuant to
section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.84 First, in Ex parte Bollman in 1807, the
Court emphasized that it could only usually issue the writ as an exercise of its
constitutional “appellate” jurisdiction,85 a result that necessarily followed from
Marbury v. Madison.86 As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “The decision that the
individual shall be imprisoned must always precede the application for a writ of
habeas corpus, and this writ must always be for the purpose of revising that
80. Fairman, supra note 62, at 632; see also id. at 632–41 (suggesting that Ahrens was wrongly
decided, and should not apply to the war crimes cases).
81. See Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1163 n.54
(1970) (“[I]f Ahrens is based on the power of a court to act it is hard to see what difference it should
make to the court’s power that the petitioner has no alternative forum.”).
82. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, unpublished opinion (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 1948), reprinted in Transcript of
Record at 16–17, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (No. 306), rev’d, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir.
1949), rev’d, 339 U.S. 763.
83. On the Supreme Court’s “original” habeas jurisdiction, see generally Oaks, supra note 13.
84. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a) (2000)).
85. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 100–01 (1807). In Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 449 (1806),
Chief Justice Marshall cited an earlier decision, United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795),
as support for the Court’s independent authority to issue the writ in aid of its constitutional appellate
jurisdiction, but Bollman settled the issue beyond doubt.
The Court would later clarify that, technically, it could issue an “original” writ of habeas corpus as an
exercise of its constitutional “original” jurisdiction in “cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, or consuls, and those in which a state is a party.” Ex parte Hung Hang, 108 U.S. 552, 553
(1883). Indeed, one of Hirota’s arguments was that he could invoke the Court’s constitutional “original”
jurisdiction directly, owing to his former responsibilities within the Japanese government. See Brief on
Behalf of the Petitioner at 5–7, Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (No. 239, Misc.) (on file with
author).
86. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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decision, and therefore appellate in its nature.”87
Bollman’s conception of the Supreme Court’s original habeas jurisdiction—
original as a statutory matter but appellate as a constitutional matter—was
reaffirmed in Ex parte Watkins in 1833,88 and expanded upon in Ex parte Yerger
in 1869.89 In Yerger, the petitioner challenged his prospective trial by military
commission without judicial warrant. His petition was denied by the circuit
court, and, pursuant to the statute upheld in Ex parte McCardle, the Supreme
Court lacked appellate jurisdiction over that decision.90 Yerger nevertheless
filed an “original” habeas petition, and the Court, relying on the denial of
Yerger’s petition by the circuit court, sustained its constitutional jurisdiction.91
As Yerger emphasized, an “original” habeas petition remained available
under the terms of the 1789 Judiciary Act especially when Congress had
otherwise constrained the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts (by then, the
Court had disavowed state-court habeas for federal prisoners92). Yerger, the last
major case on the subject, suggested that an “original” habeas petition was a
proper vehicle when there were serious questions as to the jurisdiction of the
lower courts, and where some court had already passed, to some degree, on the
lawfulness of the petitioner’s confinement.93
One additional point bears mention. As noted above, unlike in Everett, in
which the petitioners were all German, the order in Betz and its companion
cases, in which all of the petitioners were U.S. citizens, intimated that at least
two Justices—Black and Murphy—saw no problem with the petitioners re-
filing in the appropriate district court. Thus, prior to Ahrens, there was some
sentiment on the Court for the availability of lower-court federal jurisdiction
over overseas petitions so long as they were filed by U.S. citizens. Ahrens and
subsequent cases apparently left that sentiment undisturbed.94 But Ahrens’s
87. Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 101. For a modern recounting of Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion,
see ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 20–41 (2001). See also
WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 135–41 (1980) (discussing Bollman);
Oaks, supra note 13, at 159–62 (same). For a contemporary view of the broader implications of
Bollman, especially in conjunction with Tarble’s Case, see Edward A. Hartnett, The Constitutional
Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. REV. 251 (2005).
88. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 573 (1833).
89. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 106 (1869).
90. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513–14 (1869).
91. For a summary of the background to McCardle and Yerger, see William W. Van Alstyne, A
Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 (1973).
92. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 514–18, 525–26 (1858); see also Tarble’s Case,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411–12 (1872).
93. Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 96–98. To whatever extent such a conclusion did not follow directly
from Yerger, it was made explicit in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 320
(1888); In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 220 (1888). See generally Oaks, supra note 13, at 191–92 &
nn.88–89.
94. The Court implicitly hinted as much in In re Bush, in which it denied a “motion [by U.S.
servicemen] for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus . . . without prejudice to the right to
apply to any appropriate court that may have jurisdiction.” 336 U.S. 971, 971 (1949) (mem.). Bush
subsequently re-filed in a court that determined that it did have jurisdiction. See In re Bush, 84 F. Supp.
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interpretation of the habeas statute posed a formidable obstacle to the statutory
jurisdiction of district courts over petitions filed by non-citizens outside the
United States, so resorting to an original petition in the Supreme Court as in
Yerger may have been the only viable option for relief. Moreover, to whatever
extent that result may have only implicitly followed from Ahrens, it was made
more explicit by the district court decision in Eisentrager, which was handed
down just seven weeks before the applications for leave to file original habeas
petitions in Hirota were docketed. It is thus little surprise that in his habeas
petition, Hirota emphasized the extent to which Ahrens compelled the “original”
filing.95
D. JUSTICE JACKSON FORCES THE COURT’S HAND—OR WAS IT JUSTICE RUTLEDGE?
Perhaps it was the combination of the Ahrens decision, at the end of the 1947
Term, and the Eisentrager district court decision in October 1948, that explains
Justice Jackson’s tie-breaking change of heart—and unusual memorandum to
that effect—in Hirota. Or maybe it was the fact that, unlike the cases on which
the Court had previously deadlocked 4–4, Hirota was the first petition (not
counting Yamashita,96 in which Justice Jackson had also recused himself),
brought by a Japanese, rather than a German, war criminal.
Perhaps the real catalyst was a draft opinion, circulated by Justice Rutledge
on December 4, which would have publicly excoriated the Court for not at least
hearing argument in the IMTFE cases. Writing in apparent anticipation of
another summary denial of review, Rutledge repeatedly emphasized how Hirota
presented the Court with questions profoundly different from those it had
considered in Quirin, Yamashita, and Homma, because: (1) Hirota was not a
soldier; (2) Hirota had retired from public service well before December 7,
1941; (3) the legality of the United States’ participation in the IMTFE was at
least an open question; and (4) the IMTFE’s jurisdiction was in some dispute.97
As Rutledge presciently wrote:
873 (D.D.C. 1949). Four years later, in Burns v. Wilson, the Court saw no jurisdictional defect in habeas
petitions originally filed in the D.C. federal district court by U.S. servicemen who were court-martialed
overseas. See 346 U.S. 137 (1953) (plurality). The Court was sharply divided on the merits, but raised
no Ahrens-based question as to the jurisdiction of the lower courts, or its jurisdiction on appeal. Justice
Frankfurter, dissenting from the denial of rehearing, expressed as one of his concerns his discomfort
with the Court’s failure to squarely decide the jurisdictional question. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
844, 851–52 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
95. See Brief for the Petitioner at 2, Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (No. 239, Misc.).
96. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946). Whereas Justice Jackson recused himself from the
original German habeas cases because of the obvious substantive conflict stemming from his role as the
lead U.S. prosecutor at Nuremberg, his recusal from Yamashita was a byproduct of simple geography—
Jackson was still in Nuremberg for the entire time that Yamashita was before the Court.
97. Draft Opinion of Justice Rutledge, at 3–4 (Dec. 6, 1948) (on file with the Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Papers of Wiley Rutledge, Container 168, Hirota v. MacArthur Case File).
Although the draft is dated “December 6,” the copy in Justice Rutledge’s papers has a handwritten
notation suggesting that it was circulated on Saturday, December 4. See id. at 1.
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If the Yamashita and Homma cases determined, as I thought, that enemy
belligerents have none of our constitutional protections, it does not follow that
they held enemy civilians to occupy the same denuded status. Nor has this
Court yet decided that such persons or others, including our own citizens, but
exceptions [sic] perhaps enemy combatants, having access to no inferior
court, can have no remedy for reviewing action by an American military
tribunal in disregard of all constitutional limitations or like action of any such
tribunal in which our officials may participate.
For me the applications set forth serious challenges to the validity of the
Tribunal’s constitution and jurisdiction. Thereby in turn they raise grave
questions concerning this Court’s power to set in review of what has been
done. If the Tribunal is in fact a validly constituted international one, presum-
ably its action is beyond our reach. If it is in fact a political body, exercising
power under forms of legal procedure strange to our institutions and tradi-
tions, established wholly or in part by the political departments of our
Government by action our judicial institutions have no authority or power to
check, the same consequences must follow. These consequences however are
not for me either self-evident or frivolous matters, to be decided without
hearing or argument.98
Regardless of the ultimate reason, Jackson hardly disguised his motives.99
After summarizing the split amongst his brethren, Jackson observed that, “[b]y
reason of nonparticipation in the German cases, for reasons which are obvious, I
remain uncommitted on the jurisdictional issues. My nonparticipation has pre-
vented their resolution heretofore and I must decide whether another nonpartici-
pation will prevent it now. The issue transcends the particular litigation.”100
Moreover, as Everett had made clear, “[t]he fact that neither side in good grace
can retreat puts to me disagreeable alternatives as to whether I should break the
deadlock or permit it to continue.”101 Thus:
If I add my vote to those who favor denying these applications for want of
jurisdiction, it is irrevocable. The Japanese will be executed and their parti-
sans will forever point to the dissents of four members of the Court to support
their accusation that the United States gave them less than justice. This stain,
whether deserved or not, would be impressed upon the record of the United
States in Oriental memory. If, however, I vote with those who would grant
temporary relief, it may be that fuller argument and hearing will convert one
98. Id. at 3–4.
99. One of Justice Rutledge’s clerks, in a memo dated November 30, 1948, suggested that because
Justice Jackson had no reason to recuse, he “would be forced to state his position—which would, I
assume, mean a five-to-four denial of jurisdiction.” Memo from LHP to Justice Rutledge, at 2 (Nov. 30,
1948) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Wiley Rutledge, Container
168, Hirota v. MacArthur Case File). At least in some of the Justices’ chambers, then, it was unclear not
whether Justice Jackson would vote, but how.
100. Hirota v. MacArthur, 335 U.S. 876, 877 (1948) (mem.) (Jackson, J.).
101. Id. at 879.
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or more of the Justices on one side or the other from the views that have
equally divided them in the German cases. In those cases I did not feel at
liberty to cast the deciding vote and there was no course to avoid leaving the
question unresolved. But here I feel that a tentative assertion of jurisdiction,
which four members of the Court believe does not exist, will not be irrepa-
rable if they ultimately are right.102
Over the recorded dissents of four Justices, the Court set Hirota for oral
argument on Thursday and Friday, December 16 and 17, 1948.103 After Confer-
ence on Saturday, December 18, the Court issued a three-paragraph per curiam
decision denying the applications on Monday, December 20:
The petitioners, all residents and citizens of Japan, are being held in custody
pursuant to the judgments of a military tribunal in Japan. Two of the petition-
ers have been sentenced to death, the others to terms of imprisonment. They
filed motions in this Court for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus. We set
all the motions for hearing on the question of our power to grant the relief
prayed, 335 U.S. 876, 69 S.Ct. 157, and that issue has now been fully
presented and argued.
We are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing these petitioners is not a
tribunal of the United States. The United States and other allied countries
conquered and now occupy and control Japan. General Douglas MacArthur
has been selected and is acting as the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers. The military tribunal sentencing these petitioners has been set up by
General MacArthur as the agent of the Allied Powers.
Under the foregoing circumstances the courts of the United States have no
power or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and
sentences imposed on these petitioners and for this reason the motions for
leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.104
As noted, Justice Douglas recorded his concurrence, and stated that an
opinion expressing his views would follow; Justice Murphy recorded his dissent
without opinion; Justice Rutledge reserved his vote;105 and Justice Jackson, no
102. Id. at 880.
103. Owing to its remarkable length, the argument does not admit of easy distillation. For an
excellent summary, see generally Arguments Before the Court—Status of Japanese War Crimes Trial,
17 U.S.L.W. 3181 (1948).
104. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948) (per curiam). There is remarkably little
evidence in the papers of the Justices with respect to the authorship of the per curiam. Even Justice
Rutledge’s usually meticulous assignment sheets make no note of Hirota. Given the absence of any
indication to the contrary in Justice Douglas’s, Justice Jackson’s, or Justice Rutledge’s conference
notes, the best assumption is likely either that Chief Justice Vinson assigned it to himself or that it was
written at Conference.
105. There is no indication in Justice Rutledge’s papers either why he was unable to reach a decision
or whether he ever came closer to recording his vote. In a letter to Justice Douglas concerning a
revision to the U.S. Reports to indicate that Rutledge died before announcing his vote, Walter Wyatt, the
Court’s Reporter of Decisions, noted that he “discussed the matter with Mr. Justice Rutledge shortly
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longer in a tie-breaking position thanks to Justice Black—who joined the per
curiam without comment—declined to participate in the final decision.106
E. THE QUESTIONS HIROTA LEFT UNANSWERED
Save for a reference to the order setting the case for argument, the per curiam
opinion was entirely devoid of any citations to authority. Two textual clauses
therefore stand out as the opinion’s critical language: First, the Court noted that
“the tribunal sentencing these petitioners is not a tribunal of the United States.”
Second, and as a consequence, “the courts of the United States have no power
or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences
imposed on these petitioners.” But given the extent to which Hirota challenged
General MacArthur’s authority over (and role in) the IMTFE, and the extent to
which Hirota, pointedly, did not challenge the IMTFE judgment, why did these
two assertions compel the conclusion that the Court was without jurisdiction?
Was the barrier on the Court’s jurisdiction the conclusion that the “judicial
power of the United States” could not extend to reviewing an international
court—that is to say that no federal court could exercise jurisdiction over any of
Hirota’s claims consistently with Article III? Or was it a result of the case
falling outside of its constitutional “appellate” jurisdiction, leaving the petition-
ers free to re-file in the appropriate district court? The per curiam opinion,
somewhat deliberately,107 offered little help in answering these questions, which
is all the more distressing given the drastic distinction in the prospective
implications of the two theories.
On the broader view, Article III provides an outright bar to jurisdiction in any
federal court, including the Supreme Court. Hirota would therefore stand as an
insurmountable hurdle to any federal habeas petition brought by anyone held in
custody established by a foreign or international tribunal. On the narrower view,
the jurisdictional defect in Hirota was with the unusual step of invoking the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over “original” habeas petitions. Given the ab-
sence of any lower court proceedings, there was no decision to “review,” and
therefore no basis for the Court to exercise its constitutional appellate jurisdic-
tion. Such a reading of Article III would hardly preclude similarly situated
after the Fourth of July last year [1949]; and he told me that he had not yet made up his mind how he
would vote in this case.” Letter from Walter Wyatt to Justice Douglas, Apr. 18, 1950, at 1 (on file with
the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William O. Douglas, Container 186, Hirota v.
MacArthur Case File, unnamed folder).
106. See Hirota, 338 U.S. at 198–99. Jackson attended the Conference but did not participate,
writing in his own Conference notes that he had “not decided whether to participate.” Justice Jackson,
Conference Notes, at 2 (n.d.) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of
Robert H. Jackson, Container 155, Hirota v. MacArthur Case File).
107. That the per curiam opinion was short on explanation was largely at the suggestion of Justice
Black, who, according to the Conference notes of Justices Douglas, Jackson, and Rutledge, preferred a
disposition that did not explicitly rely on either jurisdictional defect. See, e.g., Conference Notes, at 2
(n.d.) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William O. Douglas,
Container 177, Certiorari, Conference & Misc Memos—Nos. 200 thru 299, Argued Cases folder).
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petitioners from proceeding first in the district courts, as court-martialed U.S.
soldiers would successfully do in Burns v. Wilson.108
1. Hirota and “the Judicial Power of the United States”
Further obfuscating the logic of the per curiam opinion is the fact that the
propositions on which it purportedly relied were both well-settled and irrel-
evant. The conclusion that “the courts of the United States have no power or
authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences
imposed on these petitioners” was already well established with respect to
entirely domestic military tribunals,109 let alone multinational military tribunals.
It nevertheless did not bar civilian courts from exercising jurisdiction over
petitions challenging military detention en toto. Recall that Chief Justice Stone
in Yamashita had already emphasized how, “[i]f the military tribunals have
lawful authority to hear, decide and condemn, their action is not subject to
judicial review merely because they have made a wrong decision on disputed
facts. Correction of their errors of decision is not for the courts but for the
military authorities which are alone authorized to review their decisions.”110
For those propositions, Stone relied on a pair of Civil War-era cases—Dynes
v. Hoover,111 in which the Court held that the civil courts lacked jurisdiction to
review judgments of courts martial unless the military courts acted without
jurisdiction, and Ex parte Vallandigham,112 where the Court held that it lacked
appellate jurisdiction via certiorari to review judgments of military commissions
convened during the Civil War. Dynes and Vallandigham stood for the proposi-
tion that, even through habeas corpus, “the civil courts exercise no supervisory
or correcting power over the proceedings of a court-martial . . . . The single
inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction.”113 Critically, though, the Court’s constitutional
appellate jurisdiction did extend to habeas petitions that did challenge the
jurisdiction of military tribunals, as Yerger demonstrated, even though the case
law was unequivocal that such entities were not, in the first instance, “courts of
the United States.”114 As Chief Justice Chase concluded in Yerger:
108. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
109. For a contemporaneous study emphasizing the point, see William F. Fratcher, Review by the
Civil Courts of Judgments of Federal Military Tribunals, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 271, 271 (1949) (“It follows
that the civil courts have no appellate power over military tribunals and may review their judgments, if
at all, only by way of collateral attack based on the tribunal’s want of jurisdiction.”). Cf. Note, Review
of International Criminal Convictions, 59 YALE L.J. 997, 1001 n.12 (1950) (surveying precedent for the
proposition that “[i]t is traditional doctrine that American courts will not directly review an act of a
foreign State even for compliance with fundamental rights.”).
110. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) (citations omitted); see supra text accompanying note 58.
111. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 83–84 (1858).
112. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 251–52 (1864).
113. United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150 (1890); see also Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S.
416, 418 (1922); In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126, 127 (1900); Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696, 697 (1882).
114. Mechs.’ & Traders’ Bank v. Union Bank of La., 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276, 295 (1874); see also
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 309 (1946) (“[M]ilitary tribunals are not part of our judicial
system.”).
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[I]t is too plain for argument that the denial to this court of appellate
jurisdiction in this class of cases must greatly weaken the efficacy of the writ,
deprive the citizen in many cases of its benefits, and seriously hinder the
establishment of that uniformity in deciding upon questions of personal rights
which can only be attained through appellate jurisdiction, exercised upon the
decisions of courts of original jurisdiction. In the particular class of cases, of
which that before the court is an example, when the custody to which the
prisoner is remanded is that of some authority other than that of the remand-
ing court, it is evident that the imprisoned citizen, however unlawful his
imprisonment may be in fact, is wholly without remedy unless it be found in
the appellate jurisdiction of this court.115
Nor, for these purposes, should the distinction between a “domestic” and an
“international” military tribunal matter, because the Court is not “reviewing”
the military judgment in either instance. Because of Dynes and its progeny, the
Article III courts cannot review any military tribunal judgment; their jurisdic-
tion extends solely to inquiring into the jurisdiction of the tribunal, and, where
extant, into other constitutional challenges to the prisoner’s detention wholly
unrelated to the tribunal. Thus, the vital point is that the Supreme Court would
have lacked jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Tokyo war crimes
tribunal even if it were a domestic court, on the strength of the Civil War-era
cases. Indeed, habeas jurisprudence more generally, at the time of Hirota,
reflected this limited conception of review. With Brown v. Allen116 still four
years away, “it was not . . . thought to be the task of the federal court on habeas
to test for error the disposition of all federal constitutional questions made in
previous . . . state adjudications.”117
But those cases did not resolve either of the two questions implicated in
Hirota: Could civilian courts resolve jurisdictional challenges to foreign or
international military tribunals? Separately, could civilian courts entertain chal-
lenges to the authority of U.S. custodians wholly unrelated to the foreign or
international court? Hirota’s petition was unambiguous that “the petitioner is
not asking this court to review the decision of an international court . . . .”118 In-
stead, “[a]ll the questions petitioner raises here with respect to violation of
rights under the Constitution, laws, treaties and international engagements of
the United States, . . . deal solely with official actions taken by General MacArthur
as citizen and army officer of the United States.”119
115. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 102–03 (1869).
116. 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953) (holding that federal constitutional questions determined in state
court proceedings could be collaterally re-litigated in federal habeas corpus proceedings).
117. Bator, supra note 39, at 465.
118. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 95, at 14.
119. Id. Hirota argued that (1) General MacArthur had no authority from Congress or the President
to create the IMTFE; (2) nothing in the Potsdam Declaration or the instrument of Japanese surrender
provided legal authority for the IMTFE; (3) General MacArthur, in accepting authority from ten Allied
nations, had violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
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To the extent that Hirota and his fellow petitioners sought review of the
IMTFE judgment, then, Dynes and Vallandigham cut against the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction to hear their claims. But to the extent that they challenged
the underlying jurisdiction of the IMTFE itself, or, separately, the constitutional-
ity of the United States’ (and particularly General MacArthur’s) participation
therein, it did not follow that Article III precluded their claims.
2. Hirota and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
An alternate, narrower reading of the per curiam opinion is that the Court
could not exercise its constitutional “appellate” jurisdiction over Hirota’s “origi-
nal” habeas petition because there was no decision by an inferior U.S. court for
it to “review” (unlike, for example, in Bollman, Yerger, and Quirin), but that
Article III imposed no bar on federal jurisdiction at large. Although such a
reading would render the current cases distinguishable, and would largely—if
not entirely—vitiate the significance of Hirota, it also runs into three insurmount-
able obstacles.
First, as a practical matter, if the decision rested on the absence only of
appellate jurisdiction, one would have expected a decision that mirrored the
order in Betz, where Justices Black and Rutledge noted that they would deny the
original petitions without prejudice to re-filing in the appropriate district court.
But Justice Black joined the per curiam without comment, allowing Justice
Jackson to recuse, and Justice Rutledge did not vote one way or the other. It
stood to reason that if the Court saw its holding as being limited to a defect in
its appellate jurisdiction, either the per curiam or Justice Douglas’s concurrence
would have said as much. Second, and along similar lines, if the only jurisdic-
tional flaw was with going directly to the Supreme Court, Hirota could have—
and surely would have—re-filed in an appropriate district court, as a U.S.
serviceman would do in 1949 when the Court denied his original petition
without prejudice to re-filing.120
Third, as a precedential matter, it was debatable, at best, whether a holding
that the Court lacked constitutional appellate jurisdiction was consistent with
Yamashita and Homma, wherein the only lower court proceedings were sum-
mary denials of relief by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, a territorial
cl. 8 (“[N]o person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, accept of any present, emolument, Office, or Title of any kind whatever from any King,
Prince, or foreign State.”); (4) given General MacArthur’s role, only Congress could create the IMTFE,
pursuant to its authority “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces,” id. § 8, cl. 14, and “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
and Offences against the Law of Nations,” id. cl. 10; and (5) the IMTFE charter violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause, id. § 9, cl. 3. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 95, at 16–19.
Hirota also made a series of arguments based on the IMTFE charter’s alleged inconsistency with the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but the bulk of his legal theories were, as the above summary suggests,
jurisdictional—they went to the IMTFE’s (and General MacArthur’s) authority ab initio. See id. at
19–20.
120. See supra note 94 (discussing the case of U.S. serviceman Arthur Bush).
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court, and certainly not, especially at the time, a “court of the United States.”121
If nothing else, it was not obvious enough to assume without any discussion.
Even Professor Oaks, who viewed this distinction as determinative both of the
existence of constitutional appellate jurisdiction in Yamashita and the absence
thereof in Hirota, nevertheless read the per curiam as reaching the broader
jurisdictional argument—as “plac[ing] its disclaimer of jurisdiction . . . on a
ground common to all United States courts, rather than on its own want of
appellate jurisdiction,” which “served further to disguise the fact that relief was
specifically outside the range of Supreme Court power.”122 In their assessment
of the 1948 Term, the editors of the Harvard Law Review expressed a similar
view.123
F. JUSTICE DOUGLAS’S CONCURRENCE
When it was finally filed on the last day of the 1948 Term (over six months
after the per curiam),124 Justice Douglas’s concurrence, too, saw the holding at
its broadest—that all federal jurisdiction over the Petitioners’ claims was be-
yond the scope of Article III. And it was upon this point that Justice Douglas
seized. First, Douglas emphasized why Ahrens was not a barrier to the exercise
of jurisdiction. “[I]t does not follow” from Ahrens, Douglas wrote, “that where
[the] place [of confinement] is not within the territorial jurisdiction of any
District Court, judicial power to issue the writ is rendered impotent.”125 Instead:
In Ahrens v. Clark, denial of a remedy in one District Court was not a denial
of a remedy in all of them. There was a District Court to which those
petitioners could resort. But in these cases there is none if the jurisdiction of
the District Court is in all respects restricted to cases of prisoners who are
confined within their geographical boundaries.126
Next, Douglas went on to reject the notion that the federal courts lacked
jurisdiction because of the IMTFE convictions. In his words:
121. In his circulated but unpublished opinion dissenting from what he saw as the Court’s impending
summary denial of review in Hirota, Justice Rutledge had expressly noted how, in Yamashita and
Homma, “[o]ne application was for certiorari from the denial of habeas corpus by the Supreme Court
of the Philippines. Other applications, however, came directly to this Court in the first instance and
were considered in the same hearing.” Draft Opinion of Justice Rutledge, supra note 97, at 3 n.6.
122. Oaks, supra note 13, at 173.
123. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1948 Term—Leading Cases, 63 HARV. L. REV. 119, 129 (1949)
(Hirota was decided “apparently on the ground that no federal court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of
habeas corpus” (emphasis added)).
124. The timing appears to have been deliberate. On the cover of a typeset draft in Justice Douglas’s
papers dated “5-19-49,” there is a handwritten note stating “HOLD ’till last.” Draft Opinion of Justice
Douglas, at 1 (May 19, 1949) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of
William O. Douglas, Container 186, Hirota v. MacArthur Case File, “Final Galley” folder).
125. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 201 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 201 (citation omitted). Justice Douglas was uniquely qualified to explain why Ahrens was
inapposite, since he authored the majority opinion in that case.
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The fact that the tribunal has been set up by the Allied Powers should not of
itself preclude our inquiry. Our inquiry is directed not to the conduct of the
Allied Powers but to the conduct of our own officials. Our writ would run not
to an official of an Allied Power but to our own official. We would want to
know not what authority our Allies had to do what they did but what authority
our officials had.
If an American General holds a prisoner, our process can reach him
wherever he is. To that extent at least the Constitution follows the flag. It is no
defense for him to say that he acts for the Allied Powers. He is an American
citizen who is performing functions for our government. . . . There is at
present no group or confederation to which an official of this Nation owes a
higher obligation than he owes to us.
I assume that we have no authority to review the judgment of an interna-
tional tribunal. But if as a result of unlawful action, one of our Generals holds
a prisoner in his custody, the writ of habeas corpus can effect a release from
that custody. It is the historic function of the writ to examine into the cause of
restraint of liberty. We should not allow that inquiry to be thwarted merely
because the jailer acts not only for the United States but for other nations as
well.127
Although Douglas’s language was general, he was emphatic that his concern
was not raised so much by the instant case as by a future case specifically
involving U.S. citizens. Douglas’s objection was that he viewed the rule laid
down by the majority as not turning on citizenship, even though he could not
envision the Court endorsing a similar result where the petitioner was Ameri-
can. In his words:
I cannot believe that we would adhere to that formula if these petitioners were
American citizens. I cannot believe we would adhere to it if this tribunal or
some other tribunal were trying American citizens for offenses committed
either before or during the occupation. In those cases we would, I feel, look
beyond the character of the tribunal to the persons being tried and the offenses
with which they were charged. We would ascertain whether, so far as Ameri-
can participation is concerned, there was authority to try the defendants for
the precise crimes with which they are charged. That is what we should do
here.128
Thus, Douglas did not concur on jurisdictional grounds; he disagreed with the
127. Id. at 204.
128. Id. at 205. That Justice Douglas was so preoccupied with a potential case involving U.S.
citizens and access to the federal courts during wartime is consistent with another overlooked opinion
from the World War II era, Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), in which the Court, per Douglas,
ordered the release of a loyal U.S. citizen held at a Japanese internment camp, as distinguished from
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), decided the same day. For a compelling account of
the case and of Justice Douglas’s central role therein, see generally Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember
Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933 (2003).
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majority’s resolution of the jurisdictional issue entirely because it would also
apply to U.S. citizens, and not only to non-citizens such as Hirota. He con-
curred, however, because while “the Tokyo Tribunal acted as an instrument of
the military power of the Executive Branch of [the U.S.] government,”129 and
was therefore not an international tribunal, “the capture and control of those
who were responsible for the Pearl Harbor incident was a political question on
which the President as Commander-in-Chief, and as spokesman for the nation
in foreign affairs, had the final say.”130 Justice Douglas agreed that the applica-
tions should be dismissed, but on political question grounds, and not for want of
jurisdiction.
The political question holding is itself worthy of note. First, on Douglas’s
view, the petition presented a political question on substantive, rather than
remedial, grounds: The Court was not asked to decide a question the resolution
of which the political branches would ignore; it was asked to decide a question
that was not judicially cognizable.131 As such, Justice Douglas, unlike his
brethren, viewed the flaw with the petitions as going to their justiciability, and
not to the Court’s jurisdiction over them.132
By then, though, it did not matter. Along with six other defendants convicted
by the IMTFE,133 Ko¯ki Hirota had been hanged at Tokyo’s Sugamo Prison
shortly after midnight local time on December 23, 1948, just three days after the
Supreme Court’s per curiam was handed down.134 Hirota also marked the end
of the Court’s short-lived experiment with hearing argument in any of the
original habeas cases. On March 7, 1949, the Court, again divided 4–4 with
Justice Jackson recused, denied five new original petitions filed in the Dachau
cases,135 and on May 2, the Court denied fifty-eight new applications,136 all but
one of which, as Fairman recounts, arose out of Nuremberg.137 The only
129. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 215 (Douglas, J., concurring).
130. Id.
131. The pre-Hirota political question cases hardly shed light on the viability of Justice Douglas’s
reasoning. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433 (1939). But that is not to say that there is nothing to commend it. To the extent that American
participation in the IMTFE was part-and-parcel of its occupation of post-war Japan, legal challenges
thereto implicated a very different aspect of the government’s constitutional authority than that
considered in, for example, the Hawaiian martial law case, Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304
(1946). See, e.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) (taking an expansive view of the govern-
ment’s constitutional authority to conduct military tribunals in occupied Germany).
132. For a contemporaneous analysis of Justice Douglas’s intentions, see Leon D. Epstein, Justice
Douglas and Civil Liberties, 1951 WIS. L. REV. 125, 154–56.
133. The other six men were General Kenji Doihara, General Seishiro¯ Itagaki, General Heitaro¯
Kimura, General Iwane Matsui, General Akira Muto¯, and Prime Minister (and former General) Hideki
To¯jo¯. See MINEAR, supra note 7, at 203.
134. See id. at 172; see also BRACKMAN, supra note 7, at 399–400; GINN, supra note 6, at 177. The
executions were carried out (some hours earlier, given the time difference) on the same day that the
Court summarily denied Hirota’s pro forma petition for rehearing.
135. In re Dammann, 336 U.S. 932, 932 (1949) (mem.).
136. In re Muhlbauer, 336 U.S. 964 (1949) (mem.).
137. See Fairman, supra note 62, at 600.
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tangible effect Hirota had on the subsequent cases was the wording of the denial
order: after Hirota, the four dissenting Justices—Black, Douglas, Murphy, and
Rutledge—noted that, instead of setting the cases for argument on the jurisdic-
tional question, the cases should be heard “in order to settle what remedy, if any,
the petitioners have.”138 Without a fifth vote, the question answered itself—
none, insofar as the U.S. courts were concerned.
II. HIROTA DISCUSSED, APPLIED, AND MISUNDERSTOOD
For two distinct, but equally important reasons, Hirota’s significance waned
rather quickly.139 First, a diminishing number of German and Japanese soldiers
remained in U.S. custody,140 especially after the political branches of the U.S.
government officially recognized the “end” of hostilities with both countries in
1951 and 1952, respectively.141 Second, the Supreme Court would soon hold, in
Johnson v. Eisentrager, that enemy aliens convicted by military tribunals had no
constitutional right to habeas corpus, and had little to nothing in the way of
other rights enforceable in U.S. courts.142 Eisentrager thus rendered the underly-
ing jurisdictional question largely superfluous, since it made little sense, espe-
cially pre-Steel Co.,143 to devote any serious attention to complex questions of
138. E.g., Muhlbauer, 336 U.S. at 965. Again, Justice Black’s unexplained switch in position back to
the dissenting side is difficult to decipher, given his crucial fifth vote for the majority in Hirota.
139. Hirota thus received fairly skimpy treatment in the academy. Although numerous reviews of the
1948 Term cited the decision, few gave it more than a cursory discussion. For two of the only
counterexamples, see J.R. Mackenzie, Recent Decisions, 47 MICH. L. REV. 835 (1949); and Willis B.
Snell, Comment, 49 MICH. L. REV. 870 (1951).
140. As Dower recounts, “[o]n December 24, 1948, the day after the seven defendants were hanged
at Sugamo, all nineteen remaining [un-indicted Class A] suspects were released on grounds of
insufficient evidence.” DOWER, supra note 10, at 454.
141. See Act of Oct. 19, 1951, ch. 519, 65 Stat. 451 (1951) (Germany); see also United States ex rel.
Jaegeler v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347 (1952) (per curiam). The war with Japan formally ended on April 28,
1952, the date on which the peace treaty between Japan and forty-eight nations, including the United
States, became effective. See Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No.
2490. See generally Vladeck, supra note 54 (manuscript at 33–34 & n.120) (explaining the significance
of the political branches’ actions).
142. See 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
143. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), the Supreme Court
rejected the doctrine of “hypothetical jurisdiction,” holding that federal courts must settle questions of
subject-matter jurisdiction before reaching any substantive questions presented, notwithstanding the
complexity of the jurisdictional question vis-a`-vis the merits. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526
U.S. 574, 583–88 (1999) (clarifying that Steel Co. does not require resolution of subject-matter
jurisdiction before other threshold issues, including personal jurisdiction and standing); see also Laura
S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207 (2001); Jack H. Friedenthal, The
Crack in the Steel Case, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 258 (2000); Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of
Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2001); Joshua Schwartz,
Note, Limiting Steel Co.: Recapturing a Broader “Arising Under” Jurisdictional Question, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 2255 (2004).
Whether Steel Co. extends to constitutional jurisdictional questions, as in Hirota (and therefore
overrides the constitutional avoidance canon), is not necessarily settled. As one prominent example to
the contrary, in the Schiavo litigation, both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit assumed the
constitutionality of the jurisdiction conferred by “Terri’s Bill,” Act of Mar. 21, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3,
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the constitutional availability of jurisdiction when the merits were so unequivo-
cally foreordained.
That is not to say, however, that there were no subsequent cases interpreting
and applying Hirota. To the contrary, one significant pre-Eisentrager D.C.
Circuit decision, Flick v. Johnson, is particularly noteworthy, for it suggests that
the Hirota per curiam was understood to sweep at least as broadly as Justice
Douglas saw it, if not more so.144
A. FLICK
To understand the significance of Flick, we must first briefly return to
Eisentrager, which was making its way through the courts while both Hirota
and Flick were decided. As noted above, the district court in Eisentrager had
concluded, in October 1948, that it lacked statutory jurisdiction over habeas
petitions filed by German citizens convicted by military tribunals and impris-
oned in Germany, summarily (and perhaps erroneously) relying on Ahrens.145
The D.C. Circuit made matters worse the following April, reversing the district
court not because it had misread Ahrens on the statutory question, but because,
in its view, the petitioners had a constitutional right to habeas corpus, one that
could not be constrained by Ahrens’s reading of the federal habeas statute.146
Up until the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit in June 1950, then, the
law of the circuit supported the jurisdictional availability of habeas corpus as a
matter of constitutional law—even for non-citizens—subject only to the ambigu-
ous limits created in Hirota.147
And so, when the D.C. Circuit decided Flick on May 11, 1949, the question
was whether Hirota barred the exercise of jurisdiction over a habeas petition
brought by a German industrial magnate convicted by a military tribunal in
occupied Germany, notwithstanding the same court’s holding one month earlier
in Eisentrager.148 Flick distinguished the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Eisentrager
§1, 119 Stat. 15, 15 (2005), in order to reach the merits of the Schindlers’ claims. See Schiavo ex rel.
Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1382–83 (M.D. Fla.), aff’d, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam). But see Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1272–75 (11th Cir. 2005)
(Birch, J., specially concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that Public Law 109-3 is
unconstitutional and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine therefore deprived the federal courts of subject-
matter jurisdiction). For a survey of the jurisdictional issue (and an intriguing alternative theory of
federal jurisdiction in Schiavo), see generally Patrick O. Gudridge, Pangloss, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007).
144. 174 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
145. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
146. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 965–66 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev’d, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
147. The district courts themselves struggled to reconcile Hirota and Eisentrager. For one particu-
larly messy example, compare the D.C. district court’s decision in Shirakura v. Royall, 89 F. Supp. 711,
713 (D.D.C. 1948) (holding that Ahrens foreclosed jurisdiction over a habeas petition brought by
Japanese soldiers sentenced to death by American military commissions in the Philippines), five days
before Hirota was decided, with its reaffirmance upon rehearing in light of Hirota and Eisentrager.
Shirakura v. Royall, 89 F. Supp. 713, 714–15 (D.D.C. 1949).
148. For an overview of the background and the difficult questions raised by the nature of the
tribunal that tried Flick, see Note, supra note 109. The district court denied Flick’s habeas petition in
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by concluding that, unlike the military tribunal at issue in the earlier case, the
tribunal convened in Flick was an “Allied” court, and was therefore, “in all
essential respects, an international court.”149 Because it was not “a tribunal of
the United States,” the court cited Hirota for the conclusion that “no court of
this country has power or authority to review, affirm, set aside or annul the
judgment and sentence imposed on Flick.”150 Although Flick did not explicitly
say as much, it therefore effectively held that, notwithstanding the constitutional
rights identified in Eisentrager, federal courts lacked constitutional jurisdiction
to entertain habeas petitions brought by non-citizens convicted by “interna-
tional” military tribunals; a statutory holding to the contrary would have been
inconsistent with Eisentrager.151
The necessary implication of Flick, then, when read together with Hirota and
the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Eisentrager, is that Article III imposes a constitu-
tional bar on all federal jurisdiction (and not just the Supreme Court’s “appel-
late” jurisdiction) over habeas petitions brought by non-citizens convicted by
“international” military tribunals.152 But the implications of Flick were even
broader, for the D.C. Circuit applied Hirota’s jurisdictional bar notwithstanding
the facts that (1) its decision in Eisentrager established that the petitioner in
Flick had a constitutional right to habeas corpus (which had not been true at the
time of Hirota); and (2) the petition was filed, in the first instance, in the district
court. Even where detainees had constitutional rights to enforce, then, Flick
read Hirota as holding that the Constitution foreclosed jurisdiction over such
claims in any U.S. court.
B. EISENTRAGER
For its broad reading of Hirota and its somewhat questionable conclusion that
April 1948, before Hirota and the district court’s decision in Eisentrager. See Ex parte Flick, 76 F.
Supp. 979 (D.D.C. 1948), aff’d, 174 F.2d 983.
149. Flick, 174 F.2d at 985. The conclusion that the tribunal was “international in character” was
dubious, at best. See Note, supra note 109, at 1001–03; see also Note, Habeas Corpus Protection
Against Illegal Extraterritorial Detention, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 368, 369 n.8 (1951) (describing Flick as
extending Hirota’s rationale “to those Nuremberg tribunals which were American in composition but
derived authority from Law No. 10 issued by the quadripartite control council”).
150. Flick, 174 F.2d at 984.
151. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Flick on November 14, 1949, on the same day that it
granted certiorari in Eisentrager. See Flick v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 879 (1949) (mem.); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 338 U.S. 877 (1949) (mem.). In Flick, Justice Black noted that he would have granted
certiorari. 338 U.S. at 879.
152. The D.C. Circuit emphasized this point in Omar in rejecting the argument that “Hirota’s
holding concerns the scope of Supreme Court jurisdiction.” Omar v. Harvey, No. 06-5126, 2007 WL
420137, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 9, 2007). As Judge Tatel observed:
[J]ust six months after Hirota, in Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1949), we applied
Hirota to a habeas corpus petition filed not in the Supreme Court, but in the district court by
an individual who, like the Hirota petitioners, had been convicted by an international tribunal.
In this circuit, then, Hirota applies to habeas proceedings in the district court. Id.
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an American military tribunal was “Allied” in character, Flick might have
become a remarkably significant decision, were it not for the Supreme Court’s
disposition of Eisentrager thirteen months later. At its simplest, Eisentrager
held that enemy aliens convicted by an overseas military tribunal had no
constitutional right to the writ of habeas corpus, a holding best understood in
the context of the D.C. Circuit’s broad conclusion to the contrary.153 Justice
Jackson’s majority opinion, hardly a model of clarity, is nevertheless fairly clear
in reaching the substance of the petitioners’ claims, and not following Hirota
and holding that Article III foreclosed jurisdiction. Nor could the Court have
followed Hirota. Unlike in Flick, there was no colorable argument that the
tribunal that convicted the petitioners was “Allied,” and therefore “interna-
tional” in character.154
Instead, the Supreme Court employed two different rationales to reverse.
First, the Court relied on the fact that the petitioners were enemy aliens detained
during the course of the war, and that, as such, they had no grounds for contesting
their detention, invoking the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 as an analogy.155 As
Justice Jackson wrote, “the nonresident enemy alien, especially one who has
remained in the service of the enemy, does not have . . . access to our courts, for
he neither has comparable claims upon our institutions nor could his use of
them fail to be helpful to the enemy.”156 In one of the most important and
unprecedented passages, Jackson continued:
153. For a comprehensive discussion of the background, see Douglas E. Dayton, Comment, A
Critique of the Eisentrager Case: American Law Abroad—Habeas Corpus at Home?, 36 CORNELL L.Q.
303, 306–07 (1951). See also Note, supra note 149.
154. As Justice Jackson explained:
the Eisentrager petitioners were tried and convicted by a Military Commission constituted by
our Commanding General at Nanking by delegation from the Commanding General, United
States Forces, China Theatre, pursuant to authority specifically granted by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff of the United States. The Commission sat in China, with express consent of the Chinese
Government. The proceeding was conducted wholly under American auspices and involved
no international participation.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766 (1950). See also In re Bush, 84 F. Supp. 873, 875 (D.D.C.
1949) (summarizing the distinction between the nature of the tribunals at issue in Eisentrager and
Flick).
155. Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (2000)); see also
Gerald L. Neuman & Charles F. Hobson, John Marshall and the Enemy Alien: A Case Missing from the
Canon, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 39 (2005) (discussing the Act and an interesting, if forgotten, early interpreta-
tion thereof by Chief Justice Marshall while riding circuit); J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy
Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1402 (1992) (summarizing the Act’s background and application); Stephen I.
Vladeck, Enemy Aliens, Enemy Property, and Access to the Courts, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007) (summarizing the evolution of the Act’s jurisprudence). “Enemy aliens” under the
Act are “all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being of the age
of fourteen years and upward, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized” when
war is declared. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000).
156. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776.
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We have pointed out that the privilege of litigation has been extended to
aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in
the country implied protection. No such basis can be invoked here, for these
prisoners at no relevant time were within any territory over which the United
States is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial
and their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court
of the United States.157
Only after arguing that the petitioners’ status as enemy aliens foreclosed
judicial review did the Court separately reiterate the importance of their extrater-
ritorial situs and the logistical difficulties inherent in entertaining the peti-
tions.158 Yet this argument—that the Court lacked statutory jurisdiction over
habeas petitioners detained abroad—was as much at the core of Eisentrager as
the Court’s emphasis that the petitioners were enemy aliens unlikely to prevail
on the merits. Indeed, as noted by Professors Laurence Tribe and Neal Katyal,
“[t]he opinion is unclear about which of two rationales justified its holding that
no habeas review was permissible. . . . The Court mentioned both factors and
did not get into the tricky business of which was doing the work.”159
Perhaps the best way to understand Eisentrager is to analyze it backwards, in
light of the decisions below: the majority opinion held that (1) enemy aliens
detained overseas have no constitutional right to habeas corpus (overruling the
D.C. Circuit); and therefore, (2) the D.C. district court’s construction of the
habeas statute as not conferring jurisdiction over the petitioners’ claims raised
no constitutional concerns. Thus, the jurisdictional holding was statutory, unlike
in Hirota, but turned on the resolution of a constitutional question as to the
rights of the petitioners.160 When Braden overruled Ahrens, it “overruled the
statutory predicate to Eisentrager’s holding,” without implicating, in any mean-
ingful way, the underlying constitutional issues.161 In the Supreme Court,
157. Id. at 777–78.
158. Id. at 778.
159. Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1306 n.174 (2002); see also Dayton, supra note 153, at 322 (noting that
the decision was “difficult indeed to disentangle”); Developments in the Law, supra note 81, at 1163
n.55 (“it is not clear whether reversal was on the basis of the Ahrens rule or on the merits of the claim”).
160. For comparable analysis, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2818–19 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Hamdan has no rights under the Suspension Clause, and that the Detainee
Treatment Act would therefore raise no constitutional question if interpreted to deprive federal courts of
jurisdiction over his claims); Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (reaching same
conclusions with respect to Military Commissions Act of 2006), cert. denied, No. 06-1195, 2007 WL
957363 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007); and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006) (same).
161. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 479 (2004). This passage from Rasul is not without criticism,
including the brunt of Justice Scalia’s intemperate dissent in the same case. See id. at 493–95 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). But like those scholars who have criticized the Rasul majority’s rationale, Justice Scalia’s
dissent ignores the relevance of the lower-court decisions in Eisentrager. Consider Justice Scalia’s
assertion that, “inasmuch as Ahrens did not pass upon any of the statutory issues decided by
Eisentrager, it is hard to see how any of that case’s ‘statutory predicate’ could have been impaired.” Id.
at 494. But that has it entirely backwards. In Eisentrager, the district court relied on Ahrens, a holding
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Eisentrager, at least on the jurisdictional question, was never about the limits of
Article III.
In dissent, Justice Black, joined by Justices Burton and Douglas, vehemently
disagreed with the majority, particularly the extent to which the holding was
based on the merits of the constitutional question—on the petitioners’ status as
“enemies.” As the dissenters noted, because the Court did not speak negatively
of Quirin or Yamashita, the constitutional rule Eisentrager enunciated was not
for “enemy” aliens, but rather for all non-citizens detained abroad. Because
Quirin and Yamashita both reached the merits of the detainees’ claims, Eisen-
trager, if it did not overrule them, turned on the extraterritorial location of the
petitioners, and not their status as “enemy aliens.” As Justice Black wrote,
The Court is fashioning wholly indefensible doctrine if it permits the execu-
tive branch, by deciding where its prisoners will be tried and imprisoned, to
deprive all federal courts of their power to protect against a federal execu-
tive’s illegal incarcerations. . . . [T]he Court’s opinion inescapably denies courts
power to afford the least bit of protection for any alien who is subject to our
occupation government abroad, even if he is neither enemy nor belligerent
and even after peace is officially declared.162
Critically, in holding that enemy aliens convicted by wholly “American”
military tribunals lacked any rights enforceable via habeas corpus, Eisentrager
necessarily foreclosed similar arguments by enemy aliens convicted by foreign
or international military tribunals. In that regard, Eisentrager rendered Hirota’s
complicated jurisdictional holding beside the point. Deep questions as to the
constitutional availability of jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by non-
citizens held overseas need not be answered when such detainees had no rights
that such jurisdiction could be used to enforce.
Nor was it necessarily clear that Eisentrager was limited to enemy aliens.
Some later cases would suggest that it foreclosed extraterritorial constitutional
rights for all non-citizens,163 as the government has repeatedly argued in the
that the Supreme Court restored. Thus, Eisentrager did in fact turn on the statutory issue decided in
Ahrens, and Braden therefore undermined at least some aspect of the holding in Eisentrager—the
district court’s decision, if nothing else. See also supra notes 77–78.
162. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 795–96 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273–74 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(suggesting that Eisentrager reinforces the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
non-citizens overseas); Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1138–42 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (relying on
Eisentrager to conclude that habeas jurisdiction did not extend to Guanta´namo Bay, Cuba, because
detainees lacked Fifth Amendment rights), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Rasul, 542 U.S. 466;
Harbury v. Deutsch, 233 F.3d 596, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (relying on Eisentrager to deny claim for
deprivation of Fifth Amendment rights by widow of Guatemalan citizen killed in Guatemala), rev’d on
other grounds sub nom. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002).
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Guanta´namo litigation.164 At the very least, in most cases involving non-
citizens, Hirota became a dead-letter.
C. AFTER EISENTRAGER
And so, in the years after Eisentrager, the only cases where Hirota played
any role were habeas petitions filed by foreign and international detainees who
were not convicted “enemy aliens” and who had constitutional rights capable of
enforcement. Needless to say, such cases were few and far between.
Typical of these decisions was United States ex rel. Keefe v. Dulles, in which
the D.C. Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain a habeas petition
filed by a U.S. serviceman convicted of robbery by a French court and serving
his sentence in France.165 As the court noted, “The petition shows on its face
that Keefe is not in the custody of the respondents. It also shows, because it
alleges he is detained by French civil authorities, that there is no one within the
jurisdiction of the court who is responsible for his detention and who would be
an appropriate respondent.”166
Later cases were to similar effect. For example, a series of cases held that
federal courts lacked jurisdiction to inquire into convictions of U.S. nationals
overseas, even when the sentences were being served in U.S. prisons pursuant
to treaty and when the citizens were in American custody, albeit pursuant to a
conviction by a foreign court.167 Along similar lines, in Duchow v. United
States, the Eastern District of Louisiana district court dismissed a habeas
petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where the petitioner, a U.S.
citizen, was in Bolivian custody for offenses committed while in Bolivia.168
The notion that U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction to inquire into foreign convic-
164. Although the Supreme Court has now twice heard cases arising out of the detention of “enemy
combatants” at Guanta´namo, the closest it has come to deciding the question of whether the detainees
have any constitutional rights was a dictum in a footnote in Rasul:
Petitioners’ allegations—that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of
terrorism against the United States, they have been held in Executive detention for more than
two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United
States, without access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing—
unquestionably describe “custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.”
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483 n.15 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
165. 222 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
166. Id. at 392. The court nevertheless construed the suit as alternatively seeking a writ of
mandamus, and reached the merits of Keefe’s claims. See id. at 392–94.
167. See, e.g., Bishop v. Reno, 210 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding no jurisdiction to grant
habeas relief of foreign-imposed sentence of a U.S. citizen); Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir.
1980) (holding no ability to challenge continued detention by U.S. authorities after transfer from
Mexican prison); Pfeifer v. Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding portions of treaty
between United States and Mexico precluding transferred prisoners from challenging foreign convic-
tions in U.S. courts constitutional). See generally Kanasola v. Civiletti, 630 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1980)
(per curiam) (summarizing the practice). In Kanasola, the Court emphasized that it was unable to act on
the petition because of the extradition treaty, and not because of Article III. 630 F.2d at 474.
168. No. 95-2121, 1995 WL 425037 (E.D. La. July 19, 1995).
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tions was hardly new, as the absence of citations to Hirota suggested. Virtually
all of the post-Hirota cases relied instead on the Supreme Court’s 1901 decision
in Neely v. Henkel,169 which reiterated the uncontroversial proposition that U.S.
courts could not inquire into the constitutionality of criminal convictions in
foreign courts even via challenges to extradition requests.170 The reliance on
Neely, instead of Hirota, only further hastened Hirota’s relegation to little more
than a historical afterthought. Only in cases in which detainees alleged that they
were in the constructive custody of the United States and did not seek to
challenge a foreign conviction—where detainees were held overseas without
trial—could Hirota have mattered.171 Unsurprisingly, no such cases were re-
ported before September 11, 2001.
III. THE MODERN HIROTA: ABU ALI AND OMAR
Hirota did not begin to reemerge until several years after September 11,
2001, as increasing numbers of detainees were held overseas without charges in
conjunction with the war on terrorism. The decision took on a special impor-
tance in cases arising out of the “extraordinary rendition” program, wherein
U.S. detainees were transferred to the custody of cooperative foreign powers,
which would incarcerate the individuals and allegedly interrogate them using
methods disapproved of within the United States.172
A. ABU ALI AND CONSTRUCTIVE CUSTODY
Like the case of Canadian Maher Arar,173 the habeas petition brought by U.S.
citizen Omar Abu Ali arose out of the U.S. government’s extraordinary rendi-
tion program.174 Abu Ali filed a federal habeas petition in the D.C. federal
district court in July 2004, alleging that, although he was in the formal custody
of the Saudi Arabian government, he was being held—and tortured—at the
behest of the United States. As Judge Bates summarized:
169. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
170. See, e.g., Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1988) (“This principle is most
often applied in cases where the courts have held that a person cannot defeat his extradition to a foreign
country on the ground that his trial in the country requesting extradition will not contain all the
safeguards guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.”). In many ways, the rule of Neely v. Henkel is a more
specific version of the general axiom that “[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of
another.” The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.).
171. For a poignant example of a case where Hirota had no impact—and was cited as such—see the
fascinating decision of the “United States Court of Berlin” in United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227,
245 n.74 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979).
172. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4; see also TORTURE: A COLLECTION (Sanford Levinson ed.,
2004).
173. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). See generally Ian Austen, Canadians
Fault U.S. for its Role in Torture Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A1.
174. For a short summary of the merits of the decision in Arar, and an argument for why it is
wrongly decided, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Rights Without Remedies: The Newfound National Security
Exception to Bivens, A.B.A. NAT’L SEC. L. REP., July 2006, at 1, available at http://www.abanet.org/
natsecurity/nslr/NSLR_july2006.pdf.
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Abu Ali is a citizen of the United States who was born and raised in this
country. He was arrested by Saudi officials while taking an examination at the
university he was attending in Saudi Arabia. The United States orchestrated
the detention and was intimately involved from the very beginning. FBI
agents attended his interrogation by Saudi officials mere days after his arrest;
FBI agents raided his parents’ home in Virginia at roughly the same time; and
three other United States citizens living in Saudi Arabia were arrested almost
simultaneous with Abu Ali and extradited to the United States to stand trial,
where one of them testified that he was told by United States and Saudi
officials that he was arrested at the behest of the United States. Abu Ali has
said that he was told the same thing by an official from the United States
Embassy.
Saudi officials have described the detention privately as a United States
matter, have acknowledged publicly that the United States has been involved
throughout his detention, and have told United States officials that they would
release Abu Ali at the request of the United States. FBI agents have interro-
gated Abu Ali at length in the Saudi prison. United States officials have also
indicated to Abu Ali and to his parents on several occasions that they could
release him if he cooperated or, if he did not, either keep him in the Saudi
prison where he would be tried without counsel or send him to Guantanamo
Bay where he would be detained as an “enemy combatant.”. . .
According to petitioners, the United States has chosen to keep Abu Ali in
Saudi Arabia because a grand jury refused to return an indictment against Abu
Ali in the United States, and because United States officials want to continue
to obtain information from him in a context that is free of constitutional
scrutiny. There is at least some circumstantial evidence that Abu Ali has been
tortured during interrogations with the knowledge of the United States. FBI
agents have despaired at his continued detention and more than one United
States official has stated that Abu Ali is no longer a threat to the United States
and there is no active interrogation. Nonetheless, he has been held indefinitely
without charge, explanation for his detention, or access to counsel since the
time of his arrest . . . .175
The government moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that Hirota barred the
exercise of federal jurisdiction over Abu Ali’s petition because Abu Ali was
formally in the custody of a foreign power—Saudi Arabia. The court rejected
the argument, relying on Abu Ali’s U.S. citizenship:
The United States can hardly rely on a decision involving non-resident aliens
challenging the sentence of a foreign military tribunal as controlling precedent
for a rule that citizens lack any rights in habeas to challenge their detention
(without charges, much less convictions) by a foreign government allegedly at
the behest of the United States. The differences between the rights of citizens
and the rights of aliens are considerable in this context, and the Supreme
175. Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 38 (D.D.C. 2004).
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Court has expressly declined to enter the debate on the rights of citizens to
habeas in cases involving the rights of aliens.176
In other words, the district court saw Hirota as distinguishable based upon Abu
Ali’s citizenship, notwithstanding the absence of any citizenship-based refer-
ence in the per curiam opinion itself.
Because the district court found the government’s other arguments unavail-
ing, it looked to Abu Ali’s allegations of U.S. custody. Because Abu Ali had
sufficiently alleged that he was in the constructive custody of the United States,
the court concluded that, taking his allegations as true, his petition satisfied the
federal habeas statute:
[G]iven the accepted breadth of the habeas statute, the imperative to construe
the “in custody” requirement expansively in favor of the petitioner and
without regard for formalisms, the absence of any language in the text that
carves out an exception where the physical custodian is a foreign body, the
many circumstances in which habeas jurisdiction has been found where the
individual was not in the immediate possession of the respondent, and the
decisions in which habeas jurisdiction was found when the executive or some
other government official was working through the intermediary of a State, a
private individual or a private corporation, the Court cannot find any basis in
the habeas statute for denying jurisdiction merely because the executive is
allegedly working through the intermediary of a foreign ally.177
After denying the government’s motion to dismiss, the district court ordered
limited discovery with respect to Abu Ali’s jurisdictional allegations.178 Al-
though the case never made it that far,179 the post-9/11 attempt to distinguish
Hirota had begun.
176. Id. at 55. For this last point, the district court relied on a passage from Eisentrager, stating that
“[c]itizenship as a head of jurisdiction and a ground of protection was old when Paul invoked it in his
appeal to Caesar. The years have not destroyed nor diminished the importance of citizenship nor have
they sapped the vitality of a citizen’s claims upon his government for protection.” Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950).
177. Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 49 (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 67–69.
179. Although it is largely immaterial to the analysis herein, I would be remiss in not noting what
subsequently transpired in Abu Ali. Shortly after Judge Bates’s ruling, the U.S. government announced
that it had (1) arranged for Abu Ali’s return to U.S. custody (vindicating one of Abu Ali’s central
claims); (2) transferred Abu Ali to Virginia; and (3) unsealed an indictment against him for, inter alia,
providing material support to al Qaeda, conspiring to assassinate the President of the United States, and
conspiring to commit aircraft piracy. See Abu Ali v. Gonzales, 387 F. Supp. 2d 16, 17 (D.D.C. 2005)
(citing United States v. Abu Ali, No. 05-CR-0053 (E.D. Va. 2005)).
As in the case of accused “dirty bomber” Jose Padilla, see Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582 (4th Cir.
2005); Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649, 1649–50 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari), the government avoided a ruling on the merits of Abu Ali’s habeas claims by transferring
him to the criminal justice system, after which Judge Bates dismissed the habeas petition as moot. See
Abu Ali, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
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B. OMAR, MOHAMMED, AND JURISDICTION OVER “MULTINATIONAL” FORCES
The government next resorted to Hirota in early 2006 in a case with facts
somewhat analogous to Abu Ali, but also closer to those at issue in Hirota.
Shawqi Ahmad Omar, a U.S. citizen, was detained in Iraq in late 2004. After
members of his family filed a habeas petition challenging his detention on his
behalf in late 2005,180 Omar sought a temporary restraining order, and subse-
quently a permanent injunction, to avoid his transfer to the custody of the
Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCC-I).181 On February 6, 2006, the district
court granted Omar’s ex parte request for a temporary restraining order,182 and,
in a more thorough opinion filed on February 13, granted a preliminary injunc-
tion.183
In opposing the injunction, the government argued that Omar could not make
out a showing of “substantial likelihood of success on the merits” because,
under Hirota, the district court lacked jurisdiction over a detainee in the custody
of the Multinational Force—Iraq, “an international coalition force, acting on
behalf and at the request of a foreign government.”184
The district court rejected the reliance on Hirota for three distinct reasons.
First, following Abu Ali and relying on Justice Douglas’s Hirota concurrence,185
the court emphasized that Omar was a U.S. citizen and that Hirota applied only
to non-citizens in international custody.186 Second, the court noted that Omar
alleged that he was in the constructive custody of the United States, and that
Hirota therefore did not apply.187 Finally, the court noted that:
the Hirota case was decided prior to significant evolution of the Supreme
Court’s habeas jurisprudence. In the time between the Hirota decision and the
Supreme Court’s most recent habeas decisions, the Supreme Court has ex-
panded and clarified the application of the “Great Writ” to better fulfill its
180. In his petition, Omar alleged that his detention violated the Due Process Clause, the Suspension
Clause, the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. §4001(a) (2000), Army regulations, international law, and his
right of access to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Omar v.
Harvey, No. 05-2374 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 12, 2005), available at http://www.burkepyle.com/Omar/Petition-
for-Habeas-Corpus.pdf.
181. See Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21–22 (D.D.C. 2006). For an overview of the
CCC-I—and the many shortcomings that have marked its proceedings—see Michael J. Frank, U.S.
Military Courts and the War in Iraq, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 645 (2006).
182. See Omar, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 22.
183. Id. at 30.
184. Id. at 23.
185. Indeed, Judge Urbina explicitly invoked Justice Douglas’s concurrence four times, describing
it, in one reference, as “prescient insight” into the case sub judice. Id. at 24 n.7.
186. Id. at 24.
187. Id. at 25 (“[W]hereas the Hirota decision indicates that the Japanese detainees were held by an
entity other than the United States, the petitioner here has presented strong evidence that he is in the
constructive custody of the United States military.”); see also id. at 25 nn.8–9; id. at 26 n.11 (“Where a
habeas petitioner challenges actions taken allegedly at the behest of the United States, the court engages
in a constructive custody analysis.”).
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ultimate purpose of allowing an individual to present “a simple challenge to
physical custody imposed by the Executive.”188
Given these considerations, the district court concluded that “the jurisdic-
tional issues in the present case do not pose a fatal obstacle at this stage of the
litigation,”189 and, after rejecting the government’s other arguments, entered a
preliminary injunction.190
The government appealed the preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, arguing that the injunction “contravenes the rule
of Hirota,” and “exceeds the boundaries of Article III and habeas principles.”191
On February 9, 2007, the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the district
court’s jurisdictional analysis, although the panel divided 2–1 on the merits—
i.e., on Omar’s entitlement to a preliminary injunction.192
Writing for the majority, Judge Tatel was quick to emphasize Hirota’s lack of
clarity: “Hirota nowhere explains which ‘circumstances’ were controlling. Nor
does anything in the opinion hold that federal courts lack habeas jurisdiction
whenever, as the government insists, American officials detaining a petitioner
are functioning as part of a multinational force.”193 Emphasizing instead that
“the opinion articulates no general legal principle at all,”194 the Court of
Appeals concluded that “Hirota would ‘control’ this case only if the ‘circum-
stances’ significant to the Court’s decision are present here. Two circumstances
are clearly the same: detention overseas and the existence of a multinational
force. But two other circumstances—foreign citizenship and criminal convic-
tion—are absent.”195 Rather than expressly rely upon the citizenship distinction
as the district courts had done in Omar and in Abu Ali, however, the D.C.
Circuit emphasized the absence of a “multinational” criminal conviction as the
critical distinction between Hirota and the current challenges. As Omar con-
cluded, “Flick . . . holds that the critical factor in Hirota was the petitioners’
convictions by an international tribunal.”196
Although there is much to commend in the D.C. Circuit’s analysis of Hirota,
it is ultimately unconvincing on this last—and key—point. Indeed, as noted
above, the argument that Flick and Hirota are distinguishable from Omar
because the earlier cases sought to collaterally challenge a conviction by a
multinational tribunal is difficult to reconcile with the nature of the habeas relief
sought in Hirota. Because the petitioners in Hirota could not use habeas to
188. Id. at 25 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004)).
189. Id. at 27.
190. Id. at 30.
191. See Brief for the Appellants at i–ii, Omar v. Harvey, No. 06-5126, 2006 WL 1706559 (D.C. Cir.
filed June 2, 2006).
192. See Omar v. Harvey, No. 06-5126, 2007 WL 420137 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 9, 2007).
193. Id. at *5.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at *6.
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collaterally challenge the underlying conviction (it was available only for
jurisdictional challenges), the fact that the petition technically sought “post-
conviction” relief was irrelevant; Hirota challenged the very authority of the
IMTFE to try him in the first place, thus his challenge was not “collateral” in
any meaningful sense of the word. And yet, as Judge Tatel noted, there are only
two grounds on which to distinguish Omar from Hirota: the absence of a
conviction by a multinational tribunal and the citizenship of the detainee. If the
former ground is unconvincing, then the result reached by the D.C. Circuit in
Omar must, ultimately, turn upon Omar’s U.S. citizenship.197
While the appeal in Omar was pending before the D.C. Circuit, two more
cases arose raising the question of Hirota’s current significance. Like Omar, the
first case, Mohammed v. Harvey, concerned a habeas petition brought by a U.S.
citizen—Mohammed Munaf198—detained by the MNF-I. Unlike Omar, who
sought an injunction barring his transfer to the custody of the CCC-I, Munaf
was in the custody of the MNF-I pursuant to a CCC-I conviction and death
sentence at the time he sought habeas relief. Thus, borrowing from Judge Tatel’s
analysis in Omar, Munaf raised only one point of distinction from Hirota:
citizenship. Judge Lamberth distinguished Omar, concluding that Munaf had
not sufficiently alleged that he was in the actual or constructive custody of the
United States, and that Hirota therefore precluded jurisdiction.199 Although
Munaf, relying on Omar, suggested that Hirota did not apply to cases involving
U.S. citizens, Judge Lamberth disagreed, stating that:
nothing in Hirota or Flick purported to turn on whether the petitioners were
citizens. The courts were without jurisdiction because the petitioners were
held under the authority of entities that were ‘not a tribunal of the United
States.’ The identity of the custodian, and the concomitant lack of habeas
197. In her partial dissent, Judge Brown suggested that the only part of the majority’s jurisdictional
analysis in which she did not fully concur was the suggestion that Hirota was distinguishable based
upon the citizenship of the detainee. See id. at *13 & n.1 (“To the extent the majority’s opinion might
be read to imply citizenship was one of the determinative factors in Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197
(1948), I note the question remains open in this circuit.”).
198. Munaf’s petition was brought by Maisoon Mohammed, Munaf’s sister. See Mohammed v.
Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 117 n.1 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Mohammed ex rel. Munaf v.
Geren, No. 06-5324 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2007).
199. Specifically:
Petitioner is . . . under the actual, physical custody of MNF-I, a multinational entity separate
and distinct from the United States or its army. He is in the constructive custody of the
Republic of Iraq, which is seized of jurisdiction in the criminal case against him, and which
controls his ultimate disposition. Petitioner thus has two custodians, one actual and the other
constructive: MNF-I and the government of Iraq. Petitioner has not shown that either
custodian is the equivalent of the United States for the purposes of habeas corpus jurisdiction.
Id. at 122.
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jurisdiction, would remain the same regardless of the petitioners’ citizen-
ship.200
Mohammed therefore is distinguishable from Omar on two counts. First, and
explicitly, Judge Lamberth did not agree that the petitioners had sufficiently
alleged the constructive custody of the United States.201 Second, and implicitly,
Judge Lamberth also disagreed that Hirota was a citizenship-specific jurisdic-
tional rule inapplicable to cases involving U.S. citizens. Whereas the first source
of disagreement is largely fact-specific, and does not seriously implicate the
underlying thesis of this Article, the second warrants further attention as it was
the basis on which the D.C. Circuit affirmed Judge Lamberth’s decision in April
2007.202
Specifically, Judge Sentelle, writing for himself and Judge Kavanaugh, empha-
sized that “Hirota did not suggest any distinction between citizens and nonciti-
zens who were held abroad pursuant to the judgment of a non-U.S. tribunal.
Indeed, Justice Douglas wrote a separate opinion criticizing the Hirota majority
for seeming to foreclose habeas review even for American citizens held in such
circumstances.”203 Although the Mohammed majority emphasized that “Hirota
does not explain why, in cases such as this, the fact of a criminal conviction in a
non-U.S. court is a fact of jurisdictional significance under the habeas stat-
ute,”204 the court nevertheless distinguished Omar on the ground that Munaf
had already been convicted by the CCC-I, reading Hirota and Flick for the
proposition that “American citizenship cannot displace the fact of a criminal
conviction in a non United States court and permit the district court to exercise
jurisdiction over Munaf’s habeas petition.”205 In addition, the majority also
rejected the argument that Hirota and Flick were distinguishable because Mu-
naf’s challenge was not a collateral attack on his conviction: “[A]s in those
cases, continued confinement is dependent on a conviction by a court not of the
United States—specifically, a multinational tribunal in Hirota and Flick and, in
200. Id. at 124. Judge Lamberth was quick to emphasize that he was not disagreeing with the logic
of Abu Ali. See id. at 126 (“This is not to say that the United States military may purposefully evade the
habeas jurisdiction of the courts, or otherwise deprive citizens of their rights, merely by cloaking its
conduct in the guise of a multinational force. Nothing in today’s holding is inconsistent with Abu Ali v.
Ashcroft, which held that ‘the United States may not avoid the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts
by enlisting a foreign ally as an intermediary to detain the citizen.’”) (citation and footnote omitted);
see also id. (“Petitioner has not alleged the kind of jurisdictional facts that would qualify this case as
one of the ‘exceptional’ instances where the United States is acting through an intermediary to detain a
citizen.”).
201. See id. at 128 n.12.
202. See Mohammed ex rel. Munaf v. Geren, No. 06-5324, slip op. at 2–3 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2007).
203. Id. at 4.
204. Id. at 6. Indeed, the majority hinted in several places that it might have reached a different
result if it did not think it was bound to follow Hirota. See, e.g., id. at 2 (noting that the court was
“[c]onstrained by precedent”); id. at 6 (“[W]e are not free to disregard Hirota simply because we may
find its logic less than compelling.”).
205. Id. at 5.
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this case, the CCC-I, which is a foreign tribunal.”206
Concurring in the judgment on the merits,207 Judge Randolph strongly dis-
agreed with the majority’s jurisdictional analysis, suggesting that both Eisen-
trager and Rasul had settled the global scope of habeas jurisdiction for U.S.
citizens beyond question.208 As Judge Randolph—the author of the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s decisions in Rasul, Hamdan, and Boumediene—concluded, “[h]abeas
petitions test the legality of detention. The fact that the United States is holding
Munaf because of his conviction by a foreign tribunal thus goes to the question
whether he is entitled to the writ, not to the question whether the court has
jurisdiction to consider the petition.”209 We will return shortly to this last—and
central—point, for to the extent that it is correct, it is not clear either how the
D.C. Circuit could so hold without overruling Hirota, or why the same logic
would not also apply to habeas petitions brought by non-citizens.
The second case, which concerned a last-minute application for a stay of
execution filed by lawyers on behalf of Saddam Hussein, presented the closest
analogy to Hirota. Relying on Flick and Hirota, Judge Kollar-Kotelly quoted an
unreported decision in a strikingly similar case for the proposition that “this
‘Court lacks habeas corpus jurisdiction over an Iraqi citizen, convicted by an
Iraqi court for violations of Iraqi law, who is held pursuant to that conviction by
members of the Multi-National Force-Iraq.’”210 Hussein, then, provides the
strongest case for the modern force of Hirota. The harder question is whether
Hirota also precludes the suits in Mohammed, Omar, and Abu Ali.
C. THE COURT’S EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE: WERE ABU ALI AND OMAR RIGHT?
To a significant degree, the district court’s decisions in both Abu Ali and
Omar were based on the argument that constructive custody was all that the
federal habeas statute (and, a fortiori, Article III) required for federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction where the petition was filed by a U.S. citizen.
It is certainly true, as the district court in Omar suggested, that Supreme
Court decisions subsequent to Hirota took a broader view of the custody
requirement in habeas cases. Central among these was Jones v. Cunningham,211
206. Id.
207. See id. at 2–3 (Randolph, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that Munaf’s claims on
the merits are precluded by the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 529 (1957)).
208. See id. at 1–2.
209. Id. at 2 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681 (1946)).
210. In re Saddam Hussein, 468 F. Supp. 2d 126, 129 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Al-Bandar v. Bush,
No. 06-2209 (D.D.C. Dec. 27, 2006)); accord Ramadan v. Bush, No. 07-0297, 2007 WL 589795
(D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2007) (to similar effect).
211. 371 U.S. 236 (1963). As the Court concluded, “[w]hile petitioner’s parole releases him from
immediate physical imprisonment, it imposes conditions which significantly confine and restrain his
freedom; this is enough to keep him in the ‘custody’ of the members of the Virginia Parole Board
within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute . . . .” Id. at 243. For a concise summary of the law
prior to Jones, and the reaction to the sea-change that the decision brought about, see DUKER, supra note
87, at 287–96. The decision, or at least its historical analysis, was harshly criticized. See, e.g., Dallin H.
Oaks, Legal History in the High Court—Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1966).
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in which Justice Black, writing for a unanimous Court, wrote that “[h]istory,
usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, besides physical imprisonment,
there are other restraints on a man’s liberty, restraints not shared by the public
generally, which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to
support the issuance of habeas corpus.”212 Although Jones did not set a specific
threshold for custody, later cases, particularly Hensley v. Municipal Court213
(which might fairly be described as the high-water mark of the Court’s expan-
sive habeas jurisprudence), emphasized that actual, physical custody was not
necessary to satisfy the “custody” requirement of the federal habeas statute.
Instead, “constructive” custody—“[c]ustody of a person (such as a parolee or
probationer) whose freedom is controlled by legal authority but who is not
under direct physical control”214—would be sufficient.215
The flaw in the district court opinions, however, is that custody was not an
issue in Hirota. The petitioners in Hirota, detained at Sugamo Prison in Tokyo,
were in the actual, physical custody of the U.S. Eighth Army, as Justice Douglas
recognized in his concurrence.216 Moreover, well before Jones, the D.C. Circuit
recognized the sufficiency of “constructive custody” in United States ex rel.
Keefe v. Dulles in 1954, all the while refusing to sustain jurisdiction over a
habeas petition brought by a U.S. serviceman in French custody.217 Keefe
suggests not that constructive custody was a means around the constitutional bar
created by Hirota; it was the relevant inquiry in cases where that bar did not
apply.218 The district courts’ custody analysis was therefore insufficient to
distinguish Hirota.
Nor is there much to commend the argument that the Supreme Court’s habeas
jurisprudence has otherwise expanded to render Hirota toothless, for none of the
212. Jones, 371 U.S. at 240.
213. 411 U.S. 345 (1973). For a fascinating—and rather delayed—circuit split over just how
expansive Jones is to be read in immigration cases, compare Subias v. Meese, 835 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.
1987) (broadly interpreting “custody” to generally include restriction from entry into the United States),
with Samirah v. O’Connell, 335 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2003) (requiring a more particularized showing of
unique restraint).
214. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 412 (8th ed. 2004).
215. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 461 F.2d 956, 957 n.1 (2d Cir.
1972); see also Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238–40 (1968) (holding that, once federal
jurisdiction attached in the district court, release of the petitioner while appeal was pending would not
defeat jurisdiction); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 64–67 (1968) (holding that a prisoner serving
consecutive sentences is in custody under any of the sentences for purposes of the federal habeas
statute); Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335, 336–37 (1968) (per curiam) (holding that petitioner could
challenge murder conviction by petition for federal habeas corpus even though granting of petition
would not result in his immediate release from prison). For a useful recent decision on the limits of
“custody” under the habeas statute, see Sadhvani v. Chertoff, 460 F. Supp. 2d 114, 118–20 (D.D.C.
2006).
216. See Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 199 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Petitioners at
the time of argument of these cases were confined in Tokyo, Japan, under the custody of respondent
Walker, Commanding General of the United States Eighth Army . . ..”).
217. 222 F.2d 390, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
218. See id.
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cases relied upon by the district courts dealt with the issue in Hirota—the limits
placed by Article III on federal jurisdiction.219 Rather, the “expansion” of the
Court’s habeas jurisprudence dealt entirely with the scope of the federal habeas
statute, particularly the meaning of the phrase “respective jurisdictions” within
28 U.S.C. §2241(a).220 It should require little in the way of analysis to conclude
that decisions regarding the scope of the federal habeas statute have no bearing
on the substantive scope of Article III.221
D. STRUCTURAL RIGHTS AND ARTICLE III: WAS JUSTICE DOUGLAS RIGHT?
The only remaining basis on which Hirota can be distinguished from the
present cases, then, is the citizenship of the petitioners. Relying on Justice
Douglas’s concurrence, the government has steadfastly argued in the present
cases that Hirota embraced no such distinction. As the above analysis should by
now suggest, this argument is correct.
It is true, of course, that the Hirota per curiam made no such distinction. And
it is equally true that Justice Douglas’s concurrence may be read as turning on
the extent to which such a distinction would be untenable. After all, why would
the concurrence devote so much attention to the implications of the majority’s
holding in cases involving U.S. citizens if the holding were limited along the
lines described by the district courts in Omar and Abu Ali?
Moreover, such a reading of Hirota—as applying irrespective of citizen-
ship—is consistent with the structural nature of Article III and with what little
has been definitively established about the nature of the “rights” that follow
from Article III’s heads of subject-matter jurisdiction. Here, we confront the
oft-invoked—but seldom explored—distinction between individual and “struc-
tural” rights.
It is not obvious, although perhaps it should be, that, as Judge Higginbotham
has written, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is best understood as a structural right,
for ‘it functions as a restriction on federal power, and contributes to the
characterization of the federal sovereign.’”222 Indeed, it is odd to conceive of
219. The only possible exception is the citizenship-based dictum from Eisentrager quoted in Abu
Ali. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. But Eisentrager, which concerned non-citizens held
overseas, can hardly call into question Hirota’s applicability to U.S. citizens.
220. See, e.g., Armentero v. INS, 340 F.3d 1058, 1061–64 (9th Cir. 2003) (summarizing the
evolution), withdrawn, 382 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2004).
221. For this reason, Judge Randolph’s suggestion in his Mohammed concurrence that Rasul called
Hirota into question is simply untenable. See Mohammed ex rel. Munaf v. Gersen, No. 06-5324, slip
op. at 1–2 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2007) (Randolph, J., concurring in the judgment). Rasul merely interpreted
the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. §2241, as extending to habeas petitions filed by detainees at Guanta´namo
Bay, Cuba. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). However obtuse Hirota’s holding may be, that it is
based upon a construction of Article III is beyond question. Given the extent to which Rasul carefully
avoided reaching any question as to the detainees’ constitutional rights, see supra note 164 and
accompanying text, it could not possibly have undermined Hirota.
222. Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 228 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Higginbotham,
J., dissenting) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982)), rev’d, 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
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subject-matter jurisdiction as a structural right not because it is not structural,
but because it is not obvious that it is a “right.” But whereas other provisions of
Article III protect interests that may be—and have been—characterized as
individual rights, it is difficult to view the constitutional authorization of federal
question jurisdiction as anything other than a structural delegation of authority
to Congress to empower the federal courts. That Congress could choose to
confer such jurisdiction to varying degrees,223 including, perhaps, only to
certain classes of individuals, is, at least for present purposes, beside the point.
The constitutional heads of jurisdiction, to the extent that they are structural,
exist irrespective of the nature of those who would invoke them.
The closest that the modern Supreme Court has ever come to explaining
Article III’s internal distinction between structural and individual rights was in
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) v. Schor, where the Court
held that the CFTC could entertain state-law counterclaims even though it was a
non-Article III court, and that the agency’s assumption of jurisdiction over such
claims did not violate Article III.224 In discussing whether a party had waived
its right to an Article III adjudication by allowing proceedings before an
administrative law judge, the Court commented at some length on the distinc-
tion between “personal” rights and Article III’s structural protections:
Article III, § 1, serves both to protect “the role of the independent judiciary
within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government,” and to safeguard
litigants’ “right to have claims decided before judges who are free from
potential domination by other branches of government.” Although our cases
have provided us with little occasion to discuss the nature or significance of
this latter safeguard, our prior discussions of Article III, § 1’s guarantee of an
independent and impartial adjudication by the federal judiciary of matters
within the judicial power of the United States intimated that this guarantee
serves to protect primarily personal, rather than structural, interests.
Our precedents also demonstrate, however, that Article III does not confer
on litigants an absolute right to the plenary consideration of every nature of
claim by an Article III court. Moreover, as a personal right, Article III’s
guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication is subject to
waiver, just as are other personal constitutional rights that dictate the proce-
dures by which civil and criminal matters must be tried. Indeed, the relevance
of concepts of waiver to Article III challenges is demonstrated by our decision
in Northern Pipeline, in which the absence of consent to an initial adjudica-
tion before a non-Article III tribunal was relied on as a significant factor in
determining that Article III forbade such adjudication.225
223. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“[H]aving a right to prescribe,
Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controver-
sies. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”).
224. 478 U.S. 833, 857 (1986).
225. Id. at 848–49 (citations omitted); see Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 897–98 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (summarizing the holding in Schor); see also
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Thus, although Schor dealt with the “personal” Article III right to “an
independent and impartial adjudication by the federal judiciary,”226 its logic
suggests that we may understand the “structural” interests enmeshed in Article
III as those that are not waivable. This distinction, of course, makes sense:
whereas personal rights, such as those rights protected by the Due Process
Clause,227 can be surrendered,228 structural protections such as subject-matter
jurisdiction (or the composition of the panel on an Article III court229) cannot
be. To the contrary, as is familiar law, structural protections must be satisfied at
every stage of the litigation, notwithstanding the position of the parties.230
The critical point, then, is that whereas the Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that personal or individual rights can differ in their scope based on
the nature of the parties invoking them,231 structural rights, in contrast, apply
with equal force to all. Structural rights, by virtue of being structural, are
independent of the parties. Thus, to the extent that the heads of subject-matter
jurisdiction contemplated by Article III, Section 2, are structural, they are
therefore not amenable to bifurcation—to applying with different force in
Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 937 (1991) (holding that the right to a district judge, instead of a
magistrate judge, does not implicate the “structural protections provided by Article III”).
226. Another example is the trial-by-jury right protected by Article III, Section 2, Clause 3. See, e.g.,
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) (“[W]e conclude that article 3, § 2, is not
jurisdictional, but was meant to confer a right upon the accused which he may forego [sic] at his
election.”), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); see also Singer v.
United States, 380 U.S. 24, 33–34 (1965) (affirming the right to waive a jury and discussing Patton.).
227. For a thorough survey of the due process issues specific to the detention of “enemy combat-
ants,” see Tung Yin, Procedural Due Process to Determine Enemy Combatant Status in the War on
Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351 (2006). See also Joseph Blocher, Policy Comment, Combatant Status
Review Tribunals: Flawed Answers to the Wrong Question, 116 YALE L.J. 667 (2006).
228. Personal jurisdiction is an obvious example. As the Supreme Court has explained:
The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. III, but from the
Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an indi-
vidual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of
sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty. . . .
Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it
can, like other such rights, be waived.
Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03 (1982) (citations and
footnote omitted).
229. Cf. Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 77–83 (2003) (holding, as a statutory matter, that a
Ninth Circuit panel that included an Article I judge was improperly constituted, even though the
Petitioner had failed to preserve the objection in the court of appeals).
230. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (discussing the
establishment of subject-matter jurisdiction as a threshold matter); Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702
(“no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court”); see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990) (“[C]onstitutional
decisions of this Court expressly according differing protection to aliens than to citizens [are] based on
our conclusion that the particular provisions in question were not intended to extend to aliens in the
same degree as to citizens.”).
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different classes of cases to which they otherwise apply on their face.232 Instead,
the scope of the jurisdiction contemplated by Article III is absolute as a
constitutional matter and admits of no internal distinctions.233
So construed, it would make little sense to view Hirota, under either possible
reading of the per curiam—that is, as barring all federal jurisdiction or as
reaching only the Supreme Court’s constitutional appellate jurisdiction—as
supporting a distinction based upon the citizenship of the party seeking to
invoke federal jurisdiction. To the contrary, entirely because constitutional
federal question jurisdiction exists irrespective of the citizenship of the parties,
it would be counter-textual to conclude that Article III foreclosed jurisdiction
over federal question suits brought by non-citizens where it did not similarly
foreclose jurisdiction over such suits by citizens.234
To be sure, citizenship, whether of a particular state or country, plays an
entirely obvious role in the federal jurisdiction contemplated by Article III. As
first-year law students learn chapter and verse, fully four of the nine heads of
federal jurisdiction prescribed by Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, are keyed to
the citizenship of the parties.235 But it hardly follows from the role citizenship
plays in the availability of federal jurisdiction in Section 2 of Article III that
232. Of course, those heads of jurisdiction that turn on the citizenship of the parties present
something of a different case, but not entirely. Consider, for example, a situation wherein courts
construed the alienage basis of Article III jurisdiction—which authorizes jurisdiction “between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”—as not extending to foreign states
with which the United States is at war. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The same analysis, I submit,
would apply, and would preclude such a holding.
233. Defenses such as sovereign immunity and the “act of state” doctrine, which have sometimes
been referred to in jurisdictional terms and might be thought of as examples of such “distinctions,” are
not jurisdictional in the constitutional sense, because they are waivable. See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998) (sovereign immunity); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521
U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (same); First City Nat’l Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767–70
(1972) (plurality opinion) (act of state doctrine waivable); cf. Moore v. United Kingdom, 384 F.3d
1079, 1083 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting the somewhat unusual interaction between sovereign immunity,
waiver, and federal jurisdiction). See generally Katherine Florey, Comment, Insufficiently Jurisdic-
tional: The Case Against Treating State Sovereign Immunity as an Article III Doctrine, 92 CAL. L. REV.
1375 (2004) (exploring the “jurisdictional” nature of sovereign immunity in more depth).
234. This argument—that structural constitutional provisions that serve to limit the power of the
federal government apply equally irrespective of the citizenship of the plaintiff—has significant
ramifications vis-a`-vis the Suspension Clause in the current detainee cases, and was at the heart of
Judge Rogers’s dissent in Boumediene. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 995–98 & n.3 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J., dissenting); see also infra text accompanying notes 268–77.
235. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to controversies . . . be-
tween a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”).
The first citizenship-based head, of course, was narrowed and effectively vitiated by the Eleventh
Amendment (and subsequent interpretations thereof by the Supreme Court). See U.S. CONST. amend.
XI; Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 754 & n.8 (2002). But see Cent. Va.
Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 994 (2006) (holding that Congress may abrogate the sovereign
immunity of the states pursuant to its power under the Article I Bankruptcy Clause); Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) (holding that Congress may abrogate the sovereign
immunity of the states pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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citizenship should also factor into the substantive limits on the “judicial Power
of the United States” recognized in Section 1.236
E. AN ARTICLE III BARRIER: WAS JUSTICE DOUGLAS WRONG?
One fundamental question remains: I have endeavored to explain that Hirota
was not compelled by then-extant precedent, and that the distinction for which it
has since come to be read cannot be sustained under a structural rights-based
view of Article III. If, then, Hirota stands as an outright jurisdictional bar to all
habeas petitions brought by detainees in foreign or international custody regard-
less of their citizenship, can it possibly stand?
Here, it is worth revisiting Justice Douglas’s concurrence, which remains the
most detailed argument on record against applying such a jurisdictional bar to
habeas petitions brought by citizens. Recall the following passage from Dou-
glas’s opinion:
The fact that the tribunal has been set up by the Allied Powers should not of
itself preclude our inquiry. Our inquiry is directed not to the conduct of the
Allied Powers but to the conduct of our own officials. Our writ would run not
to an official of an Allied Power but to our own official. We would want to
know not what authority our Allies had to do what they did but what authority
our officials had.237
It is along this axis of reasoning that the focus on custody in Omar and Abu
Ali, although impracticable as a means of distinguishing Hirota, might better
support the modern restoration of Justice Douglas’s concurrence. Of course,
Article III imposes various requirements on federal question lawsuits separate
from the minimum requirements for subject-matter jurisdiction, including stand-
ing, ripeness, mootness, and the amorphous but uncontested prohibition on
“advisory opinions” that the first three justiciability doctrines are intended to
protect.238
Although it has seldom been explored as such, the custody requirement of the
federal habeas statute serves, in most cases, to vindicate justiciability concerns.
So long as a detainee is “in custody” within the meaning of the statute, it is
unlikely, in the typical case, that a challenge to the legality of that custody will
be moot, unripe, or that the detainee will lack standing to bring such a
236. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”).
237. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 204 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring).
238. See, e.g., Levy v. Miami-Dade County, 358 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(“Generally, justiciability encompasses a range of doctrines such as standing, mootness, ripeness,
political question[s], and the prohibition against advisory opinions.” (citations omitted)); see also
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.2, at 56 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing the relation of the ban
on advisory opinions to other justiciability requirements).
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challenge.239 Viewing habeas petitions brought by foreign or international
detainees through the lens of justiciability doctrine, then, the Hirota problem
takes on a somewhat different form: If the issue in these cases is the ability of
U.S. federal courts to provide the relief requested by the petitioner, the Article
III problem is not the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction; it is the absence of
redressability, and as such, the absence of standing.240
What is therefore fascinating about Justice Douglas’s concurrence in hind-
sight is that redressability was his preeminent concern:
The conclusion is therefore plain that the Tokyo Tribunal acted as an instru-
ment of military power of the Executive branch of government. It responded
to the will of the Supreme Commander as expressed in the military order by
which he constituted it. It took its law from its creator and did not act as a free
and independent tribunal to adjudge the rights of petitioners under interna-
tional law. As Justice Pal said, it did not therefore sit as a judicial tribunal. It
was solely an instrument of political power. Insofar as American participation
is concerned, there is no constitutional objection to that action. For the capture
and control of those who were responsible for the Pearl Harbor incident was a
political question on which the President as Commander-in-Chief, and as
spokesman for the nation in foreign affairs, had the final say.241
Thus, the flaw in the relief the petitions sought was that it was relief from
what Justice Douglas viewed as an entirely political act—the constitution and
administration of the tribunal—to which Justice Douglas saw the Court as being
required to defer. Additionally, because of Quirin and Yamashita, in both of
which Justice Douglas joined the majority, any of Hirota’s serious constitutional
challenges to the validity of the IMTFE’s jurisdiction to try him were arguably
foreclosed,242 leading to Douglas’s conclusion that “[i]nsofar as American
239. I am oversimplifying because legion are the cases wherein third parties are held to lack
standing to challenge an individual’s custody, or challenges to past custody have become moot, as the
recent Padilla case typifies. But the underlying point—that the detainee himself will seldom face
constitutional justiciability prohibitions if he satisfies the custody requirement of the federal habeas
statute—remains uncontroversial.
240. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004) (under “Article III
standing, which enforces the Constitution’s case or controversy requirement, . . . [t]he plaintiff must
show that the conduct of which he complains has caused him to suffer an ‘injury in fact’ that a
favorable judgment will redress” (citations omitted)); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (“Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff
into federal court; that is the very essence of the redressability requirement.”).
241. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 215.
242. That American constitutional law has evolved to render Douglas’s analysis of the merits
anachronistic is evident from two of the Court’s post-September 11 decisions—Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004), and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). Leaving aside the merits of the
decisions in Hamdi and Hamdan, both suggest that, if nothing else, such war powers questions are no
longer presumptively non-justiciable. Cf. Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59
STAN. L. REV. 333 (2006) (analyzing whether the substantive scope of the Suspension Clause is
justiciable); Vladeck, supra note 155 (summarizing the numerous examples of courts reaching ques-
tions as to who the “enemy” is).
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participation is concerned, there is no constitutional objection.”243 But Justice
Douglas understood a point that the majority did not: Because there might be
future habeas cases brought by U.S. citizens in foreign or international custody,
and because Article III would not support a distinction based upon citizenship,
“[t]here is no room for niggardly restrictions when questions relating to [the]
availability [of habeas] are raised.”244
The flipside of Justice Douglas’s analysis, then, is that where the various
justiciability doctrines are satisfied in a habeas case brought by a foreign or
international detainee, it strains credulity to conclude, as one must read Hirota
as holding, that Article III is nevertheless a bar to consideration of such a
lawsuit. Hirota itself should have proved this point. As summarized above, most
of Hirota’s legal claims went not to deficiencies in his conviction, but rather to
infirmities, under American constitutional law, in General MacArthur’s author-
ity to create the tribunal in the first place. Hirota challenged the constitutionality
of actions by a U.S. general. Such claims may well have proven unsuccessful,
either (1) because of the political question doctrine-based reasons suggested by
Justice Douglas in his concurrence; (2) because, in point of fact, General
MacArthur had done nothing wrong; or (3) because Hirota’s claims, to the
extent they challenged actions of General MacArthur as part of an international
body, would not be redressable.
But none of those points, if true, would have compelled the conclusion that
the subject-matter jurisdiction authorized by Article III would not extend to
consideration of such a claim. Thus, Hirota’s signal defect was the Court’s
failure to apprehend that the relief Hirota sought was against a U.S. official
(MacArthur) who was alleged to be holding Hirota in violation of his constitu-
tional rights. That Hirota (1) was held under the authority of a non-U.S. tribunal
and (2) might have had no constitutional rights to enforce were irrelevant to the
subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry; they might (as Justice Douglas concluded)
have provided a winning defense on the merits. But, as is generally true, the
strength of non-jurisdictional defenses is not relevant to the subject-matter
jurisdiction inquiry.245
Thus, whereas Abu Ali and Omar may have been incorrect to rely on
allegations of constructive custody as the grounds for distinguishing Hirota,
they were both ultimately correct on the deeper point—that such custody is all
that Article III requires, in those cases, for federal courts to constitutionally
exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the habeas petitions at issue. Put
differently, the district courts, in relying solely on the question of custody,
understood a point that the Hirota Court did not: the limits imposed by Article
III over cases involving detainees in foreign or international custody go solely
243. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 215 (1948).
244. Id. at 201.
245. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1242–45 (2006) (holding that the
numerosity requirement for a company to be an “employer” for Title VII purposes is a non-
jurisdictional defense and is therefore waivable).
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to the nature of the relief sought, and not to the constitutional availability of
federal jurisdiction in the abstract.
F. WHITHER HIROTA?
Given the D.C. Circuit’s February 2007 decision in Omar,246 and its April
2007 decision in Mohammed,247 it is entirely possible that the Supreme Court
will soon be presented with the chance to reconsider Hirota.248 In some ways,
Omar is a particularly bad vehicle for reevaluating the force of the 1948
decision. First, Omar is a U.S. citizen, and so the Supreme Court could always
accept the dubious citizenship-based distinction explicitly drawn by the district
court in Omar (and implicitly affirmed by the D.C. Circuit) to avoid reaching
the deeper (and constitutionally based) question about Hirota’s continuing
applicability to non-citizens. Second, as Judge Lamberth’s decision in Moham-
med suggests, the constructive custody claim is somewhat weaker in Omar than
it was in Abu Ali, and so the basis for habeas jurisdiction is rather attenuated,
even on Justice Douglas’s view.
In a way, however, both of these points make Omar perhaps the perfect
vehicle for revisiting Hirota. On the citizenship point, if the thesis of this Article
is correct that Article III cannot tolerate a distinction based upon citizenship
along the lines expounded in Abu Ali and Omar, then so much the better for the
Supreme Court to so hold in a case where there is no question as to whether the
detainee has any substantive constitutional rights capable of enforcement in
U.S. courts.249 Similarly, on the custody point, if habeas jurisdiction is available
on the facts of Omar (notwithstanding the other potential hurdles to reaching
the merits of his claim250), then it is difficult to imagine a case wherein there is
246. Omar v. Harvey, No. 06-5126, 2007 WL 420137 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 9, 2007).
247. Mohammed ex rel. Munaf v. Gersen, No. 06-5324 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2007).
248. It is difficult to predict how the present Court would react to such a case. Certainly, several of
the current Justices have been outspoken, either in support of broad conceptions of the constitutional
scope of habeas jurisdiction, see, for example, supra note 22, or in support of very formalistic and rigid
approaches to the statutory requirements for habeas jurisdiction as in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426
(2004) and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 488–506 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But notwithstanding
the venom and vitriol that has saturated some of the Court’s recent cases over the scope of the federal
habeas statute, for example, Hamdan, Rasul, and Padilla, the scope of Article III presents a far different
question, the answer to which may not necessarily be easily predictable based upon prior decisional
law.
249. This same argument explains why the Al-Marri case, see supra note 27, presents a better case
for the constitutionality of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 than Hamdan or Boumediene.
250. If the real hurdle in these cases is redressability, then the issue in Omar is whether the petitioner
can show a meaningful entitlement to relief as against the U.S. officials acting under U.S. authority.
Thus, to the extent that Omar’s lawsuit seeks to bar his transfer to the custody of the CCC-I because of
his fear of torture, the redressability question on the merits of his suit would be whether the respondent,
Francis Harvey, Secretary of the U.S. Army, could prevent such a transfer if so ordered by a U.S.
federal district court. Given what little is known about the “MNF-I,” see, e.g., Mohammed v. Harvey,
456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 117–20 (D.D.C. 2006), it does not strain credulity to conclude that such an
argument may have merit.
Nor does it seem that there is any serious argument, unlike in Hirota, that such relief would be
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any meaningful and non-frivolous allegation of U.S. involvement in foreign or
international custody that would not also satisfy the custody requirement of the
habeas statute. Put differently, if Justice Douglas’s concurrence, at least on the
jurisdictional point, is to be the new doctrinal rule, then there may be no better
vehicle through which to solidify such a conception of the relationship between
habeas corpus, citizenship, and Article III than Omar.
CONCLUSION
The writ of habeas corpus, we are consistently told, is special.251 The rules
are different, both figuratively and literally, when it comes to the “Great
Writ.”252 Its “privilege,” the fight over the meaning of that term notwithstand-
ing,253 is enshrined in the text of the Constitution.254 Lawsuits by federal
prisoners invoking it present one of the few federal questions that state courts
have been held to lack competence to decide.255 And legislative attempts to
curtail the writ, or at least the jurisdiction of the federal courts over it, have
generated a disproportionate share of the cases at the core of the federal courts
canon, from McCardle256 to Felker257 to St. Cyr.258 Moreover, nearly all of
these cases have witnessed unusual gymnastics by the Court to avoid reaching
what Justice Breyer has called the “terribly difficult and important constitutional
question of whether Congress can constitutionally deprive [the Supreme] Court
precluded by the political question doctrine. Article 3 of the U.N. Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 51, at 198, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984), recognizes (and Congress has implemented)
the principle of nonrefoulment, which is binding upon the U.S. government, and violations of which are
enforceable in U.S. courts. See, e.g., Omar v. Harvey, No. 06-5126, 2007 WL 420137, at *7–9 (D.C.
Cir. Feb. 9, 2007) (holding that Omar’s claims are not precluded by the political question doctrine).
251. See, e.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712–13 (1961) (“Over the centuries it has been the
common law world’s ‘freedom writ’ by whose orderly processes the production of a prisoner in court
may be required and the legality of the grounds for his incarceration inquired into, failing which the
prisoner is set free. We repeat what has been so truly said of the federal writ: ‘there is no higher duty
than to maintain it unimpaired,’ and unsuspended, save only in the cases specified in our Constitution.”
(citation omitted)); see also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 579 n.1 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)
(“Both advocates and opponents of broad federal habeas corpus relief have recognized the unusual role
the Great Writ plays in our federal system.”).
For an intriguing look at the importance of habeas as a domestic matter and a multinational
conception of the writ that might solve some of the contemporary legal issues, see Vicki C. Jackson,
Symposium, World Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 303 (2006).
252. See, e.g., Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 648–50 (2005) (noting differences between the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases).
253. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337–38 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
255. See Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506
(1859).
256. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
257. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
258. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 289.
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of jurisdiction in habeas cases,”259 as typified in St. Cyr260 and Hamdan.261
Notwithstanding the special place habeas has come to occupy in American
jurisprudence, and putting aside the important and extant questions over Con-
gress’s constitutional power to limit or wholly remove the jurisdiction of federal
courts over habeas cases, Hirota’s odd and oft-ignored footnote to the Court’s
habeas jurisprudence has resurfaced without a meaningful reexamination of its
origins, its holding, or what it might possibly have meant. It is long-past time
for such a project.
Although the Hamdan decision had very little to do with Hirota, this Article
owes both its origins and its potential implications to that case, and particularly
the Supreme Court’s June 2006 decision262 reversing the D.C. Circuit263 and
holding that the military commissions created pursuant to President Bush’s
November 13, 2001, Military Order264 were inconsistent with both the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)265 and Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.266 While Hamdan has virtually nothing to do with Article III
specifically,267 or with constitutional law generally,268 it is nevertheless signifi-
cant with respect to the issues discussed in this Article because it recognizes that
the U.S. government’s treatment of detainees at Guanta´namo Bay is restrained
259. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 49.
260. In St. Cyr, the Court refused to construe a statutory provision titled “Elimination of Custody
Review by Habeas Corpus” to eliminate custody review by habeas corpus because “[t]he fact that this
Court would be required to answer the difficult question of what the Suspension Clause protects is in
and of itself a reason to avoid answering the constitutional questions that would be raised by
concluding that review was barred entirely.” 533 U.S. at 301 n.13; see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 517 (2003) (reaffirming St. Cyr’s jurisdictional analysis).
261. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2762–69 (2006); see also id. at 2810–18 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s resolution of the jurisdictional question).
262. Id. at 2749.
263. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2749 (2006).
264. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001); see also 32 C.F.R. §§ 9.1 et seq. (2006).
265. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
266. E.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 137.
267. Only Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hamdan, where, owing to his construction of the Detainee
Treatment Act, he was required to reach the constitutional questions that would result from such
jurisdiction-stripping, addressed the DTA’s compatibility with Article III, and summarily, at that. See
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2818–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268. The one exception worthy of highlighting is the Court’s apparent acceptance of the argument
that Congress may place substantive limits on the President’s war powers, including his authority to try
captured “enemy combatants” by military commission. See, e.g., id. at 2774 n.23 (“Whether or not the
President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions,
he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on
his powers.” (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring))).
The citation to Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence is perhaps misplaced, for in so holding,
Hamdan better reflects the spirit of the more decisive majority opinion delivered by Justice Black, or at
least the concurrence of Justice Clark. For more on the relationship between Hamdan and Youngstown,
see Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Separation of Powers After
Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007).
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by both U.S. domestic and international law.269 In much the same way that the
D.C. Circuit’s 1949 decision in Eisentrager held that the twenty-one petitioners
had a constitutional right to judicial review in U.S. courts,270 Hamdan compels
the conclusion that the merits of habeas petitions brought by detainees as part of
the “war on terrorism,” even non-citizens, are not as unequivocally foreordained
as, since the Supreme Court’s 1950 reversal of the D.C. Circuit in Eisentrager,
they might well have been thought to be.271
With the merits of the detainees’ claims once again an open question,272
especially as Eisentrager is increasingly called into doubt (or in cases involving
U.S. citizens, where Eisentrager is inapposite), the reemerging importance of
Hirota becomes manifest where detainees are held in “multinational” custody,
such as Omar, or cases wherein the U.S. government, possibly wary of the
impending U.S. judicial review of claims by specific detainees, transfers the
detainees to foreign custody, such as Abu Ali.273 Put another way, so long as
Hirota remains on the books, it could potentially stand as a bar to consideration
of habeas petitions such as those in Abu Ali and Omar no matter how significant
the involvement of the United States, how unconstitutional the treatment of the
detainees, nor how much the unconstitutional treatment was caused by U.S.
269. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786–98.
270. See Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1949); see also supra note 146 and
accompanying text.
271. One recent example of a case where non-citizens sought to enforce extraterritorial constitu-
tional rights helps to demonstrate the urgency of this project. In El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co.
v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1139 (2005), the Federal Circuit
dismissed, on political question grounds, a takings claim brought by a Sudanese company arising out of
the U.S. military’s 1998 destruction of a pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan. The court reached
justiciability because an earlier decision of the Court of Claims had recognized the availability of
extraterritorial takings claims for non-citizens. See id. at 1351–52 (citing Turney v. United States, 115 F.
Supp. 457 (Ct. Cl. 1953)). Yet, if the Federal Circuit’s application of the political question doctrine was
incorrect, see sources cited supra note 234, then the merits of the lawsuit become unavoidable—and, as
earlier cases suggest, extremely difficult to resolve. See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 724
F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.) (dismissing on political question grounds), rev’d, 745 F.2d 1500
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985) (mem.).
272. The two competing decisions of the D.C. district court assessing the legal claims of those
Guanta´namo detainees challenging only their underlying detention are themselves emblematic of the
thorny and complex legal questions presented by the “merits” of these suits. Compare In re Guan-
tanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005), with Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311
(D.D.C. 2005). Unfortunately, neither decision survives the D.C. Circuit’s dismissals of the suits on
jurisdictional grounds in Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 06-1195,
2007 WL 957363 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007). For a discussion of the two decisions, especially in light of
Rasul’s “footnote 15,” see Elizabeth A. Wilson, The War on Terrorism and “The Water’s Edge”:
Sovereignty, “Territorial Jurisdiction,” and the Reach of the U.S. Constitution in the Guanta´namo
Detainee Litigation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165 (2006).
273. For an excellent and comprehensive summary of the legal issues that would arise from such
transfers, see Chesney, supra note 5. Chesney’s focus on what “domestic and international legal
frameworks apply to the transfer of a detainee from U.S. custody to the custody of another state,
particularly where fear of torture is a concern,” id. at 658, dovetails with the themes of this Article,
which suggests the extent to which there may be a jurisdictional bar over post-transfer petitions by
these detainees (Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), would arguably preserve jurisdiction over
pre-transfer petitions, absent mootness concerns).
2007] 1551DECONSTRUCTING HIROTA
officials. Given the increasingly skeptical view that the Supreme Court has
taken to both doctrinal and statutory exceptions to its jurisdiction,274 and the
significance of the underlying questions presented in these cases, the importance
of a detailed understanding of what Hirota did and did not hold, and how it was
wrongly decided, should be obvious.
To be sure, there are profound questions about the extent and scope of the
rights that non-citizens, especially “enemy aliens” like Hirota, may enforce in
the federal courts. Some might well believe in the continuing viability of the
“enemy alien disability rule,” which provides that enemy aliens generally have
no right of access to the courts for any purpose;275 others might contend that
even enemy aliens are entitled to minimum procedural protections under U.S.
constitutional or international law (and that it is hardly clear, in the present
climate, who the “enemy” even is).276 Those who favor the latter view would,
of course, endorse the preservation of federal jurisdiction to conduct the thresh-
old inquiry of whether a detainee is, in fact, an “enemy alien,” and, if so, what
rights he nevertheless retains.
There are also intriguing ways in which the questions considered in this
Article dovetail with the current debate concerning Congress’s power over the
statutory jurisdiction of the federal courts, particularly in habeas cases. Perhaps
most poignantly, the conclusion that Article III can tolerate no distinction based
upon citizenship also calls into question many of the arguments concerning
citizenship-based distinctions that have been read into other “structural” consti-
tutional provisions, including, most notably, the Suspension Clause.277
Although the habeas-stripping provision of the Military Commissions Act278
may not implicate the Suspension Clause at all if the appellate remedy provided
274. Indeed, the Court’s jurisdictional decisions in the past two Terms might fairly be characterized
as evincing an ever-expanding view of the federal courts’ “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exer-
cise the jurisdiction given them.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976). See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The Increasingly “Unflagging Obligation”: Federal
Jurisdiction After Saudi Basic and Anna Nicole, 42 TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
275. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 780–82 (1950); Julian G. Ku, Customary
International Law in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 265, 322 & n.283 (2001). But see Vladeck, supra
note 155 (arguing that the “enemy alien disability rule” does not apply to any lawsuit where the plaintiff
contests his status as an “enemy alien”).
276. See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 463–64 (D.D.C. 2005); see
also Blocher, supra note 219 (highlighting flaws in the current CSRT process). Although the Supreme
Court, in its last decision before September 11, underscored the Fifth Amendment concerns implicated
by the potentially indefinite detention of aliens, see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001), it was
clear that the decision did not “consider terrorism or other special circumstances where special
arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the
judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security.” Id. at 696.
277. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
278. Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 7(a), Pub. L. No. 109-368, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36
(2006) (“No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ
of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been
determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting
such determination.”).
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for in the D.C. Circuit turns out to be meaningful and adequate,279 it may,
particularly in cases in which no appeal to the D.C. Circuit, let alone no
meaningful appeal, is provided. Justice Scalia’s response, at least, would be that
non-citizens have no Suspension Clause rights, and that such citizenship-based
jurisdiction-stripping therefore withstands constitutional scrutiny.280 To similar
effect is Judge Robertson’s opinion on remand in Hamdan,281 and Judge
Randolph’s opinion for the divided D.C. Circuit in Boumediene.282 But if the
Suspension Clause is “structural” along the lines of the jurisdictional grants
within Article III, it is difficult to conclude anything other than that non-citizens
have exactly the same “right” of access to the writ of habeas corpus as citizens.
After all, does the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clause (which, like the
Suspension Clause, appears in Article I, Section 9)283 only apply to citizens?284
Certainly, Justice Scalia’s position on the vitality of the Suspension Clause in
the latter (citizen) context is abundantly clear,285 as is the analogy to Justice
Douglas’s concurrence in Hirota, and the notion that, because the writ must be
available for citizens, it must be available for non-citizens as well. This Article’s
broader argument about Hirota and Article III may well suggest, then, that
arguments against the constitutionality of the Military Commissions Act on
Suspension Clause grounds are on far sounder footing.286
But regardless of where one comes down on these substantive rights ques-
tions, the purpose of this Article is to ensure that they are being asked. To avoid
the merits of these questions because of a strained construction of Article III is,
in short, to ignore the unique and vital role that the writ of habeas corpus has
come to play in the American legal system and to effectively vitiate Chief
Justice Chase’s impassioned reminder that “the general spirit and genius of our
institutions has tended to the widening and enlarging of the habeas corpus
279. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977) (holding that the Suspension Clause is not
implicated if a meaningful and adequate procedure for review is available).
280. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2818–19 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting); INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 336–45 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006).
282. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, No. 06-1195, 2007 WL
957363 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007).
283. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
284. In her thorough and forceful dissent in Boumediene, Judge Rogers seized on precisely this
structural argument. See 476 F.3d at 995–98 & n.3 (arguing that the Suspension Clause, like the Bill of
Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses, operates as a general prohibition on congressional action). But see
id. at 992 n.11 (majority opinion) (arguing that the Suspension Clause does not apply extraterritorially
(citing Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463,
521–24 (2007)). In a future article, I take up both sides of this important—and heretofore understudied—
debate. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008).
285. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554–58, 563–69 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
286. Of course, with respect to detainees such as the petitioners in Hamdan and Boumediene, the
Suspension Clause may only protect their right of access to the courts. If the D.C. Circuit is correct that
these detainees have no due process rights, such access to the courts may, as a practical matter, be
illusory at best.
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jurisdiction of the courts and judges of the United States . . . . We are not at
liberty to except from it any cases not plainly excepted by law . . . .”287 At an
irreducible constitutional minimum, then, the federal jurisdiction contemplated
by Article III should extend to any case where a habeas petitioner alleges
“custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States,”288 and where the court can fashion meaningful relief against an officer
of the United States.
287. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 102 (1869).
288. 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(3) (2000).
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